Billing Code: 4910-60-P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 171, 174, and 180
[Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0015 (HM-263)]
RIN 2137-AF21
Hazardous Materials: FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: PHMSA is amending the Hazardous Materials Regulations to require railroads
that carry hazardous materials to generate in electronic form, maintain, and provide to first
responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel, certain information
regarding hazardous materials in rail transportation to enhance emergency response and
investigative efforts. The amendments in this final rule address a safety recommendation of the
National Transportation Safety Board and statutory mandates in The Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation Act, as amended by the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, and complement
existing regulatory requirements pertaining to the generation, maintenance, and provision of
similar information in hard copy form, as well as other hazard communication requirements.
DATES: Effective Date: [INSERT DATE 30 DAYS FROM PUBLICATION IN THE
FEDERAL REGISTER].
Voluntary Compliance Date: [INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL
REGISTER].
Delayed Compliance Date: For Class I Railroads June 24, 2025. For Class II and III Railroads
June 24, 2026.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eamonn Patrick, 202-366-8553, Standards
and Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, D.C. 20590-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I.

II.

III.

IV.

Executive Summary
A.
What Is the Purpose of the Regulatory Action?
B.
What Are the Key Provisions?
C.
What Changed Between the NPRM and the Final Rule?
D.
What is the Economic Impact?
Electronic Hazard Communication for Rail Transportation Emergency Response
A.
What Action is Being Taken?
B.
What Is PHMSA’s Authority for This Action?
C.
Does This Action Apply to Me?
Background
A.
What Is Train Consist Information?
B.
What Was Required Regarding Train Consist Information Prior to this
Final Rule?
C.
How Does This Final Rule Impact Existing Special Permits for
Electronic Train Consist Information?
D.
How Does Train Consist Information Affect Rail Transportation Safety?
E.
How Will the Requirements for Electronic Train Consist Information Adopted
in This Final Rule Affect Rail Transportation Safety?
F.
What Does PHMSA Mean by Real-Time?
G.
How Has PHMSA Engaged Stakeholders?
Summary and Discussion of Comments
A.
Summary of Comments Received
B.
Applicability of Real-Time Electronic Train Consist Information Requirements
to Regional and Short Line Railroads
C.
Emergency Notification of Rail Accidents and Incidents Involving Hazardous
Materials
D.
Defining the Recipients of Train Consist Information
E.
Maintenance of Both Paper and Electronic Train Consists
F.
Availability of Train Consist Information in Real-Time
G.
Timing of Updates to Train Consist Information
H.
Applicability of Requirements to Freight Lines Operating on
Commuter/Passenger Rail Track
I.
Origin/Destination Information
J.
Emergency Response Point of Contact
K.
Use of the Existing AskRail® Application to Comply with This Rulemaking

V.

VI.

L.
Cost, Benefit, and Delayed Compliance Period
M.
Comments Beyond the Scope of This Rulemaking
N.
Additional Notice and Opportunity to Comment
Section-by-Section Review of Amendments
A.
Sections 171.8 and 180.503
B.
Section 174.26
C.
Section 174.28
Regulatory Analyses and Notices
A.
Statutory/Legal Authority for this Rulemaking
B.
Executive Orders 12866 and 14094, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
C.
Executive Order 13132
D.
Executive Order 13175
E.
Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
F.
Paperwork Reduction Act
G.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
H.
Environmental Assessment
I.
Privacy Act
J.
Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
K.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
L.
Cybersecurity and Executive Order 14082
M.
Severability

I.

Executive Summary

A.

What Is the Purpose of the Regulatory Action?
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is amending the

Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 171 to
180) in response to congressional mandates and a safety recommendation of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and its existing statutory safety authorities. This final rule
requires railroads transporting hazardous materials to generate train consist information in
electronic form, maintain that information off-the-train, and update that information in real-time.
Railroads must provide that information to authorized federal, state, and local first responders,
emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel1 along the train route who could be
or are involved in the response to, or investigation of, an accident, incident, or public health or
safety emergency involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials in advance of their
arrival to an accident or incident.
Additionally, immediately following either an accident involving a train carrying
hazardous materials or an incident involving the release or suspected release of hazardous
material from a train, the railroad operating the train must make an emergency notification
telephonically and provide train consist information electronically to the primary Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP)2 responsible for the area where the event occurred as well as the track
owner (if the track owner is different from the railroad operating the train). PHMSA also adopts
a requirement that railroads must test their emergency notification system at least annually. In
updating that electronic train consist information, railroads must also update the local copy

PHMSA understands “authorized Federal, State, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel” may include personnel from any of federal agencies (e.g., PHMSA, Federal Railroad
Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, or Federal
Emergency Management personnel) involved in the response to or investigation of a hazmat incident during rail
transportation, or organizations that state or local governments authorize to perform emergency response activities.
PHMSA further understands that “local first responders” includes tribal and territorial first responders.
2 A PSAP is an entity responsible for receiving 9-1-1 calls and processing those calls according to a specific
operational policy. Primary PSAPs are responsible for directly receiving 9-1-1 and other emergency calls and may
route them to other PSAPs for response.
version of the same information provided to train crews in printed paper copy. Updating both the
local printed paper copy maintained by the train crew and the electronic version of that
information maintained off the train ensures the information is consistent, accurate, and available
when needed most.
PHMSA expects this enhanced, proactive approach will ensure that emergency response
personnel have timely, accurate, actionable information regarding the hazardous materials being
transported and the hazards they may encounter when they are en route to or reach the scene of a
rail accident or incident, thereby reducing the risks to surrounding communities and the
environment while expediting site remediation, restoration of rail service, and community
engagement efforts as investigation activity proceeds. While PHMSA understands the
availability of electronic real-time train consist information may not have changed the outcome
of the recent Norfolk Southern train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, that accident and similar
events that have occurred in recent years highlight the importance of providing emergency
response personnel with timely, complete, and accurate information regarding hazardous
materials within a train—as any additional time for responders to prepare for what they will
encounter may reduce risks and result in significant public safety, commercial, and
environmental benefits.
The amendments in this final rule respond to a mandate in Section 7302 of The Fixing
America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act, Pub. L. 114-94), as amended by the
Investment Infrastructure and Jobs Act (Pub. L. 117-58),3 to require Class I railroads4
transporting hazardous materials to generate accurate, real-time, electronic train consist
information that must be provided “to State and local first responders, emergency response
officials, and law enforcement personnel that are involved in the response to or investigation of

Codified at 49 U.S.C. 20103 note.
The Surface Transportation Board categorizes rail carriers into Class I, Class II, and Class III based on carrier's
annual revenues. The threshold for Class I is a carrier earning revenue greater than approximately $1 billion/year
(2023); the threshold for Class II rail carriers is approximately $46 million/year; and the threshold for Class III rail
carriers is any value less than the threshold for Class II railroads.
3
an accident, incident, or public health or safety emergency involving the rail transportation of
hazardous materials.” However, consistent with the broader language within an NTSB safety
recommendation following the 2005 collision of two freight trains near Anding, Mississippi,
PHMSA is applying the final rule requirements to all railroads that transport hazardous materials
in light of the risks to public safety and the environment from delay in responding to releases
from smaller Class II and III railroads. In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting alternative
compliance methods as an option for Class III railroads to reduce the regulatory burden on these
small businesses while still improving the ability of emergency responders to access accurate
train consist information from these railroads. Additionally, while the proposed rule was more
narrowly focused on providing information to emergency response personnel, thanks to public
comments, this final rule adopts an approach that provides critical information to a broader group
of responders while reducing the burden on railroads.

B.

What Are the Key Provisions?
This section outlines the key provisions of the final rule. For benefit of the reader, a

discussion of the changes made between this final rule and the notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM)5 follows in section I.C. below.
Definition of “Train Consist Information:” PHMSA is amending the definition of “train
consist” at § 171.8 to be recharacterized as “train consist information,” meaning a hard (printed)
copy or electronic record of the position and contents of hazardous materials rail cars of a train
where the record includes information required by § 174.26. Specifically, the information
includes the contact information for a railroad-designated emergency point of contact; the point
of origin and destination of the train; shipping paper information required by §§ 172.201 to
172.203; and emergency response information required by § 172.602(a). PHMSA also makes a

88 FR 41541 (Jun. 27, 2023). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-06-27/pdf/2023-13467.pdf

conforming revision to § 180.503 to delete a definition of “train consist” that is not used in that
part.
Notice to Train Crews: PHMSA is amending the requirements in § 174.26 to provide
train consist information (as PHMSA defines that term at § 171.8) in local printed paper form to
train crews prior to movement of hazardous materials by rail. Specifically, PHMSA clarifies
responsibilities for railroads to provide a local printed paper copy version of train consist
information to train crews; for train crews to update that local copy version of train consist
information; and that the local copy of the train consist information must be maintained in a
conspicuous location of an occupied locomotive or in the possession of a train crew member if
they evacuate the locomotive during an accident or incident. Railroads must also ensure that train
consist information is generated and updated in electronic form; maintained offsite of the train
itself; and immediately accessible by the railroad’s designated emergency response point of
contact. Railroads must ensure the local printed paper copy and electronic train consist
information maintained off the train are at all times accurate and consistent.
Note that Class III railroads complying with the alternative compliance method adopted
in this final rule are not required to maintain and update train consist information in electronic
form. Instead, they must have a written plan that identifies how the railroad will provide accurate
train consist information to local emergency responders; inform local emergency response
organizations and PSAPs about their plan (and any material changes made to the plan after the
original notification); enact the plan during incidents or accidents requiring emergency response;
and test the plan at least annually.
Emergency Response Information Sharing Requirements: PHMSA creates a new section
at § 174.28 that establishes real-time, electronic train consist information-sharing requirements
for hazardous materials transported by rail. Railroads transporting hazardous materials must
generate and provide train consist information by electronic means to authorized federal, state,
and local first responders; emergency response officials; and law enforcement personnel who

could be involved in the response to—or investigation of—an accident, incident, or public health
or safety emergency involving the rail transportation of hazardous material. Information
generated and shared in accordance with this section must be accurate; provided in a secure and
confidential manner consistent with the intent of the FAST Act; and accessible at any time by
authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel.
In the event of either an accident involving a train carrying hazardous materials, or
incident involving the release or suspected release of hazardous material, railroads operating
trains carrying hazardous material are required to immediately notify the primary PSAP
responsible for the area where the incident occurred telephonically and the track owner (if the
track owner and the railroad operating the train are different), and provide the train consist
information to the primary PSAP/track owner electronically in a form that the PSAP/track owner
is capable of readily accessing (i.e., a form the PSAP/track owner can access and use based on
the specific information technology resources they have available) to assist in response and
investigation efforts. This emergency notification requirement applies to situations that require
response from local emergency response agencies. For example, PHMSA does not expect that a
railroad will provide emergency notification and train consist information to the primary PSAP
responsible for the area where the incident occurred due to the release of a minimal amount of
material from the routine operation of service equipment, provided the release does not cause
property damage, injury to employees, or any danger to public safety or health. PHMSA
emphasizes that the emergency notification requirement adopted in this final rule does not affect
a railroad’s responsibility to continue to comply with all applicable local, state, and federal
reporting requirements related to releases of hazardous materials, hazardous substances, oil, or
any similar subjects.
Class III railroads may comply with the requirements applicable to Class I and II
railroads, or they may comply with an alternative method for providing train consist information

to authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel. This alternative method is discussed in greater detail in Sections IV.B
and V.C below. To summarize the alternative requirements, Class III railroads must develop a
written plan that identifies how the railroad will provide emergency notification and accurate
train consist information to local emergency responders; notify emergency responders along their
route of the contents of the plan (and any material changes made to the plan after the original
notification);6 conduct a test at least annually to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan; and
enact the plan in the event of a rail incident or accident requiring response from local emergency
response agencies.
Finally, railroads must develop a test program and conduct tests of their emergency
notification and electronic train consist transmission system at least annually, to ensure reliability
of these systems across their network. Class III railroads complying with the alternative
compliance method must conduct a test, at least annually, demonstrating that their written plan is
effective for emergency notification and transmission of train consist information.

C.

What Changed Between the NPRM and the Final Rule?
In response to comments received to the NPRM, PHMSA is making the following

changes in this final rule. See Section IV for further details on the reasoning and impact of these
changes.
Table: Changes Between the NPRM and the Final Rule
•

NPRM Proposal
One-year compliance
period for
all railroads

Final Rule Requirement
• One-year compliance
period for
Class I railroads
•

Two-year compliance
period for
Class II and III railroads

•

Explanation
This extension in the compliance
period for Class II and III
railroads provides these smaller
entities with additional time to
make the necessary changes to
their operations and systems to
comply with the requirements of
this final rule.

In this context, PHMSA notes our expectation that a Class III railroad utilizing the alternate compliance method
will notify local emergency response agencies of any significant changes to the procedures outlined in the plan, such
as a change to the type of technology used to provide accurate train consist information.
•

•

NPRM Proposal
Final Rule Requirement
Train consist
• Train consist information
information must include
must include the origin and
information on the origin
destination of the train.
and destination of all
hazardous materials
transported on the train.

Railroads must provide
prompt emergency
notification of an
accident or incident
involving hazardous
materials to every stateauthorized local first
responder within a 10mile radius.

•

Railroads must provide
immediate emergency
notification of an accident
or incident involving
hazardous materials to the
primary PSAP responsible
for the area where the
incident occurred
telephonically and the track
owner (if the track owner is
different than the railroad
operating the train).

•

Explanation
This revision of a proposed
requirement aligns the final rule
more closely with the FAST Act
mandate for data on train origin
and destination, which will
provide responders with
information on the train’s
direction of travel.

•

This revision is intended to
ensure the incident commander
receives critical train consist
information without providing
confusing notifications to
unaffected jurisdictions.

•

This adjusted notification
requirement is intended to ensure
railroads have an operable
system in place to make the
emergency notification, and that
operational procedures are
practiced regularly.

•

Railroads must test their
emergency notification
system at least annually,
and create and retain
records of the results of the
tests (e.g., was the test
notification received and
acknowledged
immediately).

•

The contact information for
the railroad’s designated
emergency point of contact
must include a phone
number.

•

This revision to a proposed
requirement acknowledges that
including a specific individual’s
name, title, and e-mail address is
not practical for the constant,
round-the-clock operational
nature of rail transportation of
hazardous materials.

•

The contact information
for the railroad’s
designated emergency
point of contact must
include name, title, email address, and phone
number.

•

All railroads are subject •
to the same requirements
in § 174.28 for
Electronic Train Consist
Information.

There are alternative
compliance requirements
for Class III railroads.

•

PHMSA concludes that different
operational considerations for
Class III railroads and relative
economic burdens for small
businesses must be accounted for
to facilitate effective
implementation, and thus has
created an alternative compliance
requirement for Class III
railroads.

•

Train crews may use
electronic or radio
communications to

•

Train crews may use
electronic, radio
communications, or other

•

This editorial revision to the
proposed requirement clarifies
further the flexibility railroads

NPRM Proposal
notify the railroad to
update electronic train
consist information.

Final Rule Requirement
means to notify the railroad
to update the electronic
train consist information.

Explanation
can use to communicate train
consist changes to their
centralized electronic system.

•

The requirements for
electronic real-time train
consist information
apply to a railroad
carrying hazardous
material.

•

The requirements for
electronic real-time train
consist information apply
to a railroad operating a
train carrying hazardous
material.

•

This editorial revision to a
proposed requirement clarifies
that the railroad operating a train
carrying hazardous materials is
subject to the requirements of
this rule, rather than the track
owner (if the track owner is
different that the railroad
operating the train).

•

Emergency notifications
must be made promptly.

•

Emergency notifications
must be made immediately.

•

This editorial revision (replacing
“promptly” with “immediately”)
better conveys PHMSA’s
intention in the NPRM that
railroads notify the primary
PSAP /track owner as quickly as
possible after learning of the
accident or incident.
“Immediately” is understood to
have more urgency than
“promptly.”

•

n/a

•

The proposed paragraphs in
§ 174.28(c) (security) and
(d) (provision of train
consist information) are
redesignated (d) and (e),
respectively

•

The creation of a new paragraph
(c) in § 174.28 to authorize
alternative compliance
requirements for Class III
railroads requires redesignation
of the proposed (c) and (d) to (d)
and (e).

•

The NPRM provided no
clarification on the types
of accidents or incidents
involving release or
suspected release of
hazardous materials
requiring emergency
notification.

•

PHMSA is clarifying that
•
only accidents and incidents
that require activation of
local emergency response
resources must be
immediately reported and
accompanied with
electronic train consist
information.

It was not PHMSA’s intent to
require the notification of local
emergency response resources
and provision of train consist
information in circumstances that
do not require emergency
response.

D.

What Is the Economic Impact?
PHMSA estimates the final rule impacts six Class I railroads, 14 Class II railroads, and

638 Class III railroads, and estimates the undiscounted total financial impact of the rule over a 10
year analysis period to be about $17.7 million in 2022 dollars, for an average annual cost of $1.8
million. The discounted total cost of the rule over the analysis period is estimated to be $15.8
million in 2022 dollars at a two percent discount rate, for an average annual cost of $1.6 million.

The benefits of this final rule will depend greatly on the effectiveness of having timely access to
real-time train consist information to improve authorized federal, state, and local first responders,
emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel’s ability to respond to rail
accidents and incidents, which may be a high-consequence/low-probability event such as the
Norfolk Southern train derailment at East Palestine, Ohio.
PHMSA anticipates the final rule will improve authorized federal, state, and local first
responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel’s ability to promptly
identify all the hazardous materials cars involved in an accident and to assess the threat from a
hazardous materials release in a timely manner. PHMSA estimated the annual damage cost of
hazardous material incidents on rail to be $15 million in 2022 dollars. Therefore, the rule would
have to reduce damage costs by about 12 percent for the monetized benefits of the rule to equal
costs. The following table summarizes the annual costs and benefits of the major provisions of
the final rule in constant 2022 dollars.
Requirement

Average Annual Cost
Undiscounted
2%

Amending the
definition of
train consist
information

$327,847

$291,089

Amending
notice to train
crew

$1,169,018

$1,036,601

$275,018

$251,219

$1,771,883

$1,578,908

New
emergency
response
information
sharing
requirement
Total

Benefit

Breakeven

By aligning the definition of
the FAST Act with the
language in the existing
regulation, this amendment
improves regulatory clarity.
By improving emergency
personnel’s ability to
promptly identify all the
hazardous materials
involved in an accident and
assess the threat from a
hazardous materials release,
the provisions will reduce
injuries and fatalities,
material loss and response
costs, and delays caused by
closures.

Cost-effective if
this requirement
reduces the
consequences of
hazardous
material incidents
by rail by about
11.8 percent.

As illustrated by the Norfolk Southern train derailment incident at East Palestine, Ohio,
such accidents can have substantial impacts that are not quantified by the final regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) in this rulemaking—including the long-term environmental concerns and health
risks (both physiological and psychological) for local residents. Research also shows that such
accidents can reduce property values, which—in turn—can slow down economic activity in the
area.7 Additionally, of the 140,000 total route-miles of track in the U.S., 104,000 miles are in
rural and tribal areas, suggesting that train-related hazardous material incidents mainly happen in
areas populated by disadvantaged communities.8 PHMSA acknowledged and considered these
unquantified factors in adopting the provisions of the rulemaking.

II.

Electronic Hazard Communication for Rail Transportation Emergency Response

A.

What Action Is Being Taken?
In this final rule, PHMSA adopts a requirement for railroads transporting hazardous

materials to generate, maintain externally to the train itself, and update in real-time, accurate
train consist information in electronic form, and to make this information available to authorized
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel at all times upon request. Further, PHMSA requires that, in the event of either an
accident involving a train carrying hazardous materials, or an incident involving the release or
suspected release of hazardous material, railroads operating trains carrying hazardous material
must immediately telephonically notify the primary PSAP responsible for the area (i.e., having
jurisdiction) where the incident occurred, and forward that train consist information to the
primary PSAP and the track owner (if the railroad operating the train and the track owner are
different) in a form that the PSAP and track owner are capable of readily accessing. Class III

For example, a study that examines the impact of 33 derailments involving hazardous material on property values
in New York State between 2004 and 2013 found that, on average, a derailment depreciates housing values within a
one-mile radius by five to eight percent (Chuan Tang et al. (2020). Rail accidents and property values in the era of
unconventional energy production. Journal of Urban Economics, 120, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2020.103295
8 See PHMSA, “Improving Rail in Rural Communities,” https://railroads.dot.gov/rural (last accessed May 3, 2023).
railroads may comply with the requirements adopted for Class I and II railroads, or they may
comply with the alternative requirements adopted in this rule for planning, notifying, and
providing accurate train consist information to local emergency response agencies. PHMSA also
makes conforming and clarifying revisions to previously existing HMR requirements governing
notification (via local printed paper copy documentation) of train crews for trains carrying
hazardous material.
PHMSA is adopting a delayed compliance period of one year from the date of publication
of this final rule for Class I railroads to allow railroads sufficient time to implement (via
conducting training, procurement and installation of pertinent equipment and software, and
development of procedures and security protocols) measures for generating, organizing, and
providing train consist information in electronic form to authorized federal, state and local first
responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel. PHMSA is adopting a
delayed compliance period of two years for Class II and III railroads to allow these smaller
railroads additional time to implement the systems and procedures necessary to comply with this
final rule. Detailed discussions of comments received to the rulemaking docket are provided in
Section IV below, and discussion of changes to sections of the HMR based on this rule are
provided in Section V below.

B.

What Is PHMSA’s Authority for This Action?
PHMSA’s statutory authority for this action is twofold. Section of 7302 of the FAST Act,

as amended by the Investment Infrastructure and Jobs Act, directs the Secretary of
Transportation (Secretary) to issue regulations to require Class I railroads transporting hazardous
materials to generate accurate, real-time, electronic train consist information that must be
provided “to State and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel that are involved in the response to or investigation of an accident, incident, or public
health or safety emergency involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials.”

Specifically, Section 7302(a)(1) directs the Secretary to require that Class I railroads include the
following data in connection with such electronic, real-time train consist information:
•

Identity, quantity, and location of hazardous materials on a train;

•

Point of origin and destination of the train;

•

Emergency response information or resources required by the Secretary; and

•

Emergency response point of contact designated by the Class I railroad.
Section 7302(a)(4) directs the Secretary to prohibit any Class I railroad, employee, or

agent from withholding, or causing to be withheld, that information from authorized entities.
Section 7302(a)(5) directs the Secretary to establish security and confidentiality protections,
including protections from the public release of proprietary information or security-sensitive
information, to prevent the release of real-time train consist information to unauthorized persons.
Finally, Section 7302(a)(6) directs the Secretary to allow each Class I railroad to enter into a
memorandum of understanding with any Class II railroad or Class III railroad that operates trains
over the Class I railroad’s line to incorporate the Class II railroad’s or Class III railroad’s train
consist information.
In addition to the FAST Act mandate, the Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act (HMTA; 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) at 49 U.S.C. 5103 gives the Secretary general authority to
issue regulations for the safe transportation of hazardous material in commerce.
The Secretary delegates the above statutory authorities to PHMSA at 49 CFR 1.97.

C.

Does This Action Apply to Me?
The action in this final rule applies to all railroads that transport hazardous materials in

commerce. Although the FAST Act contains an explicit requirement only for Class I railroads
transporting hazardous materials to generate and provide accurate, real-time, electronic train
consist information, in this final rule PHMSA adopts requirements—pursuant to its delegated
general authority under the HMTA to make regulations for the safe transportation of hazardous

materials including those materials transported by rail—for Class II railroads to also compile,
update, and forward accurate, real-time train consist information in electronic form. Class III
railroads may comply with the requirements adopted for Class I and II railroads, or they may
comply with the alternative requirements adopted in this rule for planning, notifying, and
providing accurate train consist information to local emergency response agencies.
PHMSA notes that this broader approach to include all railroads transporting hazardous
materials in the United States is consistent with the inclusive language within NTSB safety
recommendation R-07-04 issued following the 2005 collision of two freight trains containing
hazardous materials near Anding, Mississippi. Safety recommendation R-07-04 called on
PHMSA to require that all railroads immediately provide real-time train consist information to
emergency responders following an accident or incident involving rail transportation of
hazardous material.9
NTSB’s safety recommendation is consistent with the common-sense proposition that rail
transportation of hazardous material is not limited to Class I railroads, and thus the prospect of
an accident or emergency is also not limited to those railroads. Class II and III railroads
(hereinafter referred to as “regional and short line railroads”) also transport hazardous material
and account for more than one third of freight rail in the United States, covering about 50,000
miles of the 140,000-mile U.S. freight rail network. Further, regional and short line railroads are
typically the first and last mile of service, and often serve as the only connection of rural, small
town, and tribal areas of the United States to the nationwide network of railroads—similarly,
emergency response personnel within those areas are likely to be the only personnel close
enough to the incident or accident to respond quickly. Thus, it is vital for authorized federal,
state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel in
areas served by these railroads to also have access to accurate and real-time train consist

NTSB, NTSB/RAR-07/01, “Collision of Two CN Freight Trains near Anding, Mississippi on July 10, 2005” at 48
(Mar. 2007) (NTSB Report), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR0701.pdf.
information. In this final rule, PHMSA is providing a longer delayed compliance period (two
years) for Class II and III railroads in recognition that they may need additional time to develop
the necessary systems and procedures to comply with this final rule.
Finally, PHMSA is providing clarification in this final rule that the requirement to
provide real-time train consist information applies to the railroad operating the train carrying
hazardous materials, not the track owner—if the track owner and the railroad operating the train
are different entities. For example, if a freight railroad is utilizing a passenger railroad’s tracks to
move a train carrying hazardous materials, the freight railroad is the entity responsible for
complying with the real-time train consist requirements PHMSA is adopting in this final rule.

III.

Background

A.

What Is Train Consist Information?
The train consist generally refers to the contents of a train including the position of

locomotives and cars, as well as both non-hazardous and hazardous freight within those cars.
Prior to the adoption of this final rule, the HMR defined “train consist” in § 171.8 as “a written
record of the contents and location of each rail car10 in a train.” In this final rule, PHMSA is
adopting the definition of train consist information as proposed in the NPRM: “Train consist
information means hard (printed) copy or electronic record of the position and contents of each
hazardous material rail car where the record includes the information required by § 174.26 of this
subchapter.”

B.

What Was Required Regarding Train Consist Information Prior to this Final Rule?
Prior to publication of this final rule, the HMR at § 174.26(a) required that railroad train

crews must have a local paper document that reflects the current position in the train of each rail

A rail car means a car designed to carry freight or non-passenger personnel by rail, and includes a box car, flat car,
gondola car, hopper car, tank car, and occupied caboose.
car containing a hazardous material, and must update it to indicate changes in the placement of a
hazardous material rail car within the train.11 The regulations required the train crew to update
the document, and allowed for updates by handwriting or by appending or attaching another
document. Additionally, § 174.26(b) required that the train crew must also have a copy of a
document showing the information required on hazardous materials shipping papers, including
applicable emergency response information.
A common practice for railroads in satisfying the above regulatory requirements was
capturing all required information in a single hard copy (generally printed) document (sometimes
referred to as the “train consist” or “train list”) that is provided to train crews. Some railroads,
primarily those designated as Class I, compile information in an electronic database (which could
be maintained by the railroad itself, or by a third-party vendor utilizing the “cloud”) and provide
hard copies of some of the database information to the train crew. Those electronic databases
may include more information than just the contents and location of a hazardous material rail car
in the train; they may incorporate information linking the hazardous material at each location in
the train with shipping papers (commonly referred to as bills of lading, required by part 172,
subpart C) and emergency response information (required by part 172, subpart G).

C.

How Does This Final Rule Impact Existing Special Permits for Electronic Train Consist
Information?
Starting in 2019, several railroads applied for and were granted special permits to allow

train consist information documentation to be maintained and communicated using only
electronic means in connection with specific service routes. To date, seven special permits (SPs)
have been issued,12 including for six Class I railroads: DOT-SP 20954 (issued to BNSF Railway
PHMSA notes that the train consist documentation requirements discussed throughout this final rule complement
other hazard communication requirements within part 172 pertaining to marking (subpart D), labelling (subpart E),
and placarding (subpart F) of hazardous material packages and transport containers and vehicles.
12 Special permits may be reviewed at www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/special-permits-search.
DOT-SPs 20954, 21059, 21110 and 21266 are active while DOT-SP 21053 is active under pending renewal, along
Company); DOT-SP 21046 (issued to CSX Transportation and currently expired); DOT-SP
21053 (issued to Canadian National Railway Company); DOT-SP 21323 (issued to Canadian
Pacific Railway Company and currently expired); DOT-SP 21059 (issued to Union Pacific
Railroad Company); and DOT-SP 21110 (issued to Norfolk Southern Railroad). A single special
permit (DOT-SP 21266) has been issued to a Class III railroad: Richmond Pacific Railroad. The
special permits provide operational controls and reporting requirements, including the following:
•

Train consist information must be readily available by electronic means to government
officials (e.g., emergency response personnel);

•

Updates of the train consist information must be done electronically and in real-time;

•

More than one method of electronic information-sharing must be available to first
responders should the primary method (i.e., cellular network devices) not work, as well
as a redundant communication option should electronic service be unavailable;

•

Upon notification of an incident to response authorities, the train consist information
must be provided;

•

Training must be provided to first responders along portions of a route without cellular
service on methods of communication during an incident; and

•

Incidents where information was shared electronically with first responders must be
documented, and a consolidated report must be provided to PHMSA discussing successes
and any corrective actions.
Electronic train consist information has been provided to emergency responders in

accordance with the requirements of these special permits. For example, BNSF Railway
Company has reported four occasions where electronic train consist information was shared with
first responders to assist in prompt emergency response. However, PHMSA is not prepared to
adopt the requirements of these special permits into the HMR for general use at this time. We

with several party-to applications, and DOT-SPs 21046 and 21323 expired by its terms. PHMSA also notes that
although Norfolk Southern is a grantee of a special permit, the routes that they included in their application did not
include the route along East Palestine, Ohio.

believe more operational experience is needed in both ordinary service—particularly in remote
areas where communication services may not be available—and during rail emergencies before
we can rely on electronic devices for the train crew’s copy of train consist information for all
routes in the United States. Therefore, PHMSA will continue to consider requests for renewal,
party status, and new applications for special permits related to electronic devices used to display
and transmit the train crew’s copy of train consist information in accordance with our standard
procedures. (See 49 CFR part 107, subpart B.)

D.

How Does Train Consist Information Affect Rail Transportation Safety?
Train consist information aids federal, state, and local first responders, emergency

response officials, and law enforcement personnel in ensuring coordinated action to assess an
accident, incident, or public health or safety emergency involving hazardous materials in rail
transportation. This communication in turn informs the appropriate response action (e.g.,
selecting the correct fire suppression media) precisely when every second counts.
Officials typically rely heavily on this information—along with hazard communication
on the railcars themselves required pursuant to part 172 requirements pertaining to marking
(subpart D), labeling (subpart E), and placarding (subpart F)—for timely awareness about
hazardous material on a train in emergency situations. The local copy of train consist information
maintained by the crew can often be the only accurate basis of knowledge on the hazardous
material within a train because marking, labeling, and placarding may be damaged or
inaccessible (due to fire, hazardous material release, or orientation of the rail car); train crews
may be injured or unavailable; or wireless telecommunications service may be limited. There is a
premium on having a common understanding of the hazardous material on the train as
coordinated response efforts commence because emergency response may involve personnel

from different and distant jurisdictions converging on a single location at different times.13
Timely, accurate train consist information also ensures investigation efforts by federal and state
personnel can promptly identify systemic safety issues meriting broader dissemination, and
address community concerns regarding the availability and reliability of information following
an accident or incident.
An example taken from a 2007 NTSB investigation report14 underscores the importance
of the availability of timely, accurate train consist information documentation. In the early
morning hours of July 10, 2005, two Canadian National Railway Company (CN) trains carrying
mixed freight including hazardous material collided head-on in Anding, Mississippi. The
collision resulted in the derailment of six locomotives and 17 cars. About 15,000 gallons of
diesel fuel were released from the locomotives and resulted in a fire that burned for roughly 15
hours. There also was a limited release of hazardous materials from venting tank cars; however,
that did not contribute to the severity of the accident. Two crewmembers from each train were
killed in the accident and the train consist information aboard the locomotives was destroyed.
Nearly 100 residents from the surrounding community were evacuated from the area as a
precaution. The accident ultimately resulted in approximately $10 million (in 2005 dollars) of
property damage and environmental clean-up costs.
When emergency responders arrived on the accident scene within a half-hour of the
collision, it was dark; the fire was intense; and heavy black smoke prevented visual identification
of all the hazardous material tank cars in the wreckage. The first CN official arrived at the scene
an hour after the collision and told emergency responders that he did not have any train consist
information documentation or knowledge about the hazardous materials on either train. The
absence of train crews to pass along train consist information and the inability to access the
information on the locomotive—i.e., the lack of immediately available train consist

PHMSA notes that if an incident or accident occurs in a rural, small town, or tribal areas, local emergency
response personnel may be the only personnel who can respond promptly to the incident or accident.
14 NTSB Report at 2-10.
information—severely restricted the ability of emergency responders to make a quick assessment
of the potential for a hazardous materials release and thus respond appropriately.
The CN official obtained accurate train consist information on the northbound train via
cell phone from the CN dispatcher and provided it to emergency responders, but cell phone
service was disrupted before any information about the southbound train could be obtained.
Without a document for the southbound train, unsuccessful attempts were made by response
personnel on-scene to identify potential hazardous material threats based on placarding and tank
car stenciling—i.e., visible hazard signage and markings on the rail cars. More than two-and-ahalf hours after the collision, another CN employee who traveled from Jackson, Mississippi,
(roughly 45 minutes away from the accident) delivered copies of the train consist information for
both trains—but the information he delivered for the southbound train did not accurately reflect
the actual makeup of the southbound train at the time of the accident. It was nearly another hour
(almost four hours since the collision) before CN officials and emergency responders were able
to develop an accurate listing of the derailed cars from the southbound train involved in the fire
by visually surveying the scene. Only after being able to determine which hazardous materials
were being conveyed on the train was it safe for emergency responders to begin moving cars and
applying aqueous film forming foam to suppress the fires at the site. It would be roughly 14
hours after the collision before the fire was declared suppressed.
In reviewing the collision and emergency response efforts, the NTSB concluded that the
lack of timely information on the contents of each train—between the loss of train crew
personnel, the damaging of stenciling and hazard placarding, and CN’s failure to provide timely
and accurate train consist information for both trains (particularly the southbound train)—
significantly hampered emergency response efforts. The NTSB consequently issued safety
recommendation R-07-04 calling on PHMSA to require that all railroads immediately provide

real-time train consist information to emergency responders following an accident or incident
involving rail transportation of hazardous material.15
The importance of timely, accurate train consist information is also underscored by the
recent Norfolk Southern train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. Although NTSB’s investigation
of that derailment is ongoing, the NTSB noted during a press conference announcing their
preliminary findings on February 23, 2023, that many of the hazardous materials placards
displayed on the tank cars melted in the ensuing fire following the derailment.16 Firefighters who
responded to the incident from more than 30 minutes away also noted that they didn’t gain
access to information about the train consist until well after they arrived on scene. PHMSA notes
that in such scenarios, emergency response personnel may have to rely on the train consist
information provided by the train crew during their initial assessment of the incident and while
planning initial response actions. Notably, too, the East Palestine, Ohio, accident exemplifies
how investigation efforts by regulatory officials into potential systemic issues revealed by an
incident (or to assuage community anxieties regarding the response effort) can often occur
simultaneously with incident response efforts at the site.

E.

How Will the Requirements for Electronic Train Consist Information Adopted in This
Final Rule Affect Rail Transportation Safety?
Prior to the adoption of this final rule, the HMR imposed some documentation

requirements pertaining to hazardous material within a train. Specifically, each of §§ 171.8
(“written record”) and 174.26 (“copy of a document”) contemplated that a “train consist” is a
printed, hard copy, relating only high-level information (the “contents and location of each rail
car in a train”) pertaining to any hazardous materials being transported. Although provisions

See NTSB Report at 48 (“With the assistance of the Federal Railroad Administration, require that railroads
immediately provide to emergency responders accurate, real-time information regarding the identity and location of
all hazardous materials on a train.”).
16 NTSB, Preliminary Report No. RRD23MR005, “Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment with Subsequent
Hazardous Material Release and Fires – East Palestine, Ohio – Feb. 3, 2023 (Feb. 23, 2023),
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf.
elsewhere in the HMR governing emergency response (specifically, part 172, subpart G)
contemplate that train crews will need to have, or have “immediate” access to, more fulsome
information (regarding hazardous material technical name, emergency response information,
emergency response telephone numbers, etc.), § 172.602(b) similarly contemplates that
information will be in hard copy (“printed”) form rather than electronic form.
The limited documentation requirements in the HMR prior to the adoption of this final
rule contributed to delays in emergency response actions and potentially inaccurate information
being provided to emergency response personnel at precisely the same moment when accurate,
timely information was critical to response efforts. The success of any response effort turns on
the accuracy of information regarding the precise hazards confronting emergency response
personnel and the surrounding community. But as illustrated by both the Anding, Mississippi,
collision and the East Palestine, Ohio, derailment, emergency response personnel may not be
able to rely on hazard communication placarding or stenciling to know with confidence whether,
and in which car, a train is carrying hazardous material as those hazard communication tools may
have been obscured (e.g., through burning) or been rendered inaccessible. Moreover, emergency
response personnel cannot necessarily rely on the train crew or the hard copy of the train consist
information they may have onboard. As in the Anding, Mississippi, collision, train crews can
become incapacitated and hard copies of the train consist information may be destroyed in the
incident. Even if those resources are available, they may only be available in the form of a single
document or to a limited number of persons on the train crew, thereby creating the potential for
conflicting information or bottlenecking of critical information within (potentially multidisciplinary and multi-jurisdictional) response efforts.17 Additionally, the fact that emergency
response personnel converging on the site from multiple jurisdictions may not have access to that
information until they arrive forfeits opportunities to begin reviewing pertinent immediate

PHMSA submits that some of the same limitations from reliance solely on hard-copy, locally maintained train
consist information could also arise in connection with reliance on electronic copies (e.g., on an e-tablet) maintained
by train crews.
actions and coordinating response efforts while en route to the site—which may add more delay
in the critical moments immediately following an accident or incident.18 Lastly, because
investigation efforts often proceed nearly simultaneously with emergency response, delays in
obtaining accurate train consist information can hamper investigation efforts to identify systemic
issues or even an imminent hazardous materials transportation safety hazard that could result in
similar incidents elsewhere, or to address community concerns regarding the adequacy of
response efforts.
PHMSA finds that maintaining electronic train consist information away from the train
and updating this information in real-time as the position and number of railcars containing
hazardous materials on a train change, addresses many of those shortcomings from reliance
solely on the local copy of train consist information. Remote (e.g., in the “cloud”) compilation
and maintenance of an electronic copy of train consist information that is synced in real-time
with the local copy of that information maintained by train crews per § 174.26 as hard (printed)
copy promotes the accuracy of both remote and local copy versions of that information, each of
which can be checked against the other. And, to the extent that the compilation and updating of
that remote electronic record occurs automatically, it can minimize the introduction of human
error into either hard or electronic versions of the train consist information.
Additionally, as illustrated by the Anding, Mississippi, collision, the local copy of train
consist information maintained in the locomotive may be destroyed or inaccessible, or train
crews may become injured, rendering them ineffective for the exchange of information to
emergency response personnel. Reliance on a single hard or electronic copy document, or on a
limited number of personnel, risks bottlenecking or creating conflicting accountings of critical
information. In contrast, remote compilation and maintenance of an electronic version of train
consist information will provide necessary redundancy for a railroad’s ability to exchange critical

This risk can be particularly acute if the accident or incident occurs in a remote rural, small town, or tribal area, as
local first responders may be the only personnel who can quickly respond to the accident or incident.
information with emergency response personnel, promising distribution of critical information
that is more uniform, fulsome, well-distributed, and timely than reliance on hard copies and train
crew personnel alone. Additionally, remotely maintained, electronic train consist information
promotes earlier coordination of emergency response efforts; emergency response personnel
traveling to an incident site from various jurisdictions may be able to access electronic train
consist information (as well as pertinent training and immediate actions) en route, saving
precious time in identifying immediate actions and coordinating response efforts. Electronic train
consist information can also facilitate investigation efforts in parallel with emergency response
efforts, thereby allowing more timely identification and remediation of systemic issues across the
industry, as well as helping to assure affected communities of the adequacy of response efforts.
PHMSA notes that the experience with the special permits authorizing limited use of
electronic approaches to maintaining train consist information discussed in Section III.C above
provides additional evidence of the potential safety-enhancing benefits of requiring use of such
tools more broadly. PHMSA also notes that stakeholders within the emergency response
community have also submitted comments in this rulemaking proceeding, calling on PHMSA to
codify a requirement for electronic, real-time train consist information to supplement existing
hard copy documentation requirements.19 See Section IV below for further information on
comments received to this rulemaking proceeding, including supportive comments from
emergency response organizations.

F.

What Does PHMSA Mean by Real-Time?
A plain language meaning of real-time is simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) with the

time which something takes place. PHMSA interprets the references in the FAST Act instruction

See, e.g., Intl. Assn. of Fire Chiefs, Doc. No. PHMSA-2016-0015-0009, “Comments on PHMSA’s Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [under RIN 2137-AF21]” at 3 & 6 (Apr. 19, 2017) (IAFC Comments). The IAFC
comments urged a defense-in-depth approach utilizing both electronic and hard copy train consist information
because exclusive reliance on electronic train consist information maintained remotely may be impractical in rural,
small-town, or tribal areas where internet connectivity is limited or unreliable.
and NTSB safety recommendation R-07-04 to “real-time” train consist information to have a
dual meaning: (1) that the update of train consist information during transportation should occur
at the time changes to the hazardous material on the train are being made, thereby ensuring the
accuracy of information; and (2) that the required train consist information is provided to
authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel at the time a response to or investigation of an accident, incident, or
public health or safety emergency is occurring. This latter element in turn means that the
required electronic train consist information should be provided and accessible to authorized
personnel before an accident or incident—and pushed immediately following initiation of an
accident or incident to emergency response personnel needing that information to identify
potential hazardous material threats, take appropriate measures, and commence investigation
activities.
Although PHMSA understands that the HMR as written prior to the publication of this
final rule required operators to update hard (printed) copy train consist information as there are
changes to that information, in practice that hard-copy exclusive approach can introduce the
potential for human error. Often a member of the train crew (in most circumstances, the
conductor) must update by hand the local printed paper copy of the train consist information in
the crew’s possession to provide an accurate listing of the position of hazardous material cars.
Additionally, PHMSA understands that the HMR as written prior to the publication of this final
rule did not contain specific requirements for railroads to either (1) make accurate, electronic,
real-time train consist information available to authorized emergency response personnel at all
times so they have it in advance of an accident or incident, or (2) take affirmative steps to
immediately notify and forward that same information to state-authorized local first responders
or primary PSAP following either an accident involving a train carrying hazardous material, or
an incident involving a train carrying hazardous material where a release of that hazardous
material has occurred or is suspected. As discussed in Section III.B. above, the HMR as written

prior to the publication of this final rule required the use of local printed paper copies that may
not lend themselves to real-time updating or transfer to a person off the train. The HMR also
lacked specificity regarding railroads’ obligations to forward that information to authorized
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel in a proactive and timely manner; rather, the HMR spoke in terms of making that
information “accessible” to train crews (§ 172.602(c)); merely “available” to first responders,
emergency response officials, or law enforcement personnel (§ 172.600(c)); in the possession of
train crews (§ 174.26(a)); and submitted to the National Response Center “as soon as practical
but no later than 12 hours after the occurrence of any incident . . . ” (§ 171.15).
PHMSA expects that implementation of equipment and procedures to enable real-time
updating of electronic train consist information—as well as more explicit requirements for
railroads to make that information available to authorized federal, state, and local first
responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel at all times and to
push the information to them via the primary PSAP following an accident or incident—will be
practicable for Class I, Class II, and for many Class III railroads.
As a general matter, PHMSA submits that the requirements adopted in this final rule
should not come as a surprise to any railroad transporting hazardous material as the Section 7302
FAST Act mandate (focused by its terms on Class I railroads) dates from 2015 and NTSB safety
recommendation R-07-04 (which contains no such limitation to Class I railroads) dates from
2007.20 Nor are the requirements adopted in this final rule on the cutting edge of technology—
the sort of equipment and procedures needed for implementation are likely to be incremental
adaptations of supply chain management software, equipment, and procedures employed in
ordinary course by a variety of retail providers and logistics companies for tracking goods within

In this final rule, PHMSA provides a one-year delayed compliance period for Class I railroads, and a two-year
delayed compliance period for Class II and III railroads. This provides ample time for the railroads to make any
necessary changes to their operations and systems to comply with the requirements of the final rule. PHMSA is also
adopting an alternative compliance method for Class III railroads to reduce compliance burdens on these small
businesses.
national and global supply chains (of which the railroads themselves are a critical component).
PHMSA submits the fact that commercial entities can implement cost-effective, real-time status
tracking procedures and equipment for non-hazardous goods suggests that reasonably prudent
railroad operators would be incentivized to employ similar equipment and procedures when
transporting materials known to be hazardous to public safety and the environment.21
Additionally, railroads will not be implementing the requirements of this final rule
against a blank canvas. As discussed above, much of the train consist information that PHMSA
contemplates would be generated, maintained, and provided in electronic form is largely already
maintained by the railroads pursuant to existing HMR requirements in printed form; and
PHMSA’s requirement adopted in this final rule that such information be readily accessible in
advance of an accident or incident, and forwarded to primary PSAPs electronically in a form the
PSAP is capable of readily accessing immediately following an accident or certain incidents, is
similar to existing HMR requirements to make certain information available to emergency
response personnel and train crews. As discussed in Section III.C above, a number of the Class I
railroads (and at least one short line railroad) have already demonstrated the feasibility of
compiling electronic real-time train consist information pursuant to special permits along
specific routes; those special permits contain requirements for the update and prompt relay of
that electronic train consist information to emergency response personnel in the event of an
accident or incident.
PHMSA also submits that railroads may be able to leverage existing software platforms
to satisfy this final rule’s electronic train consist information maintenance, updating, and
forwarding requirements. One such platform suggested by stakeholders in this rulemaking
proceeding is the AskRail® system developed by the American Association of Railroads (AAR),

PHMSA also submits that such incentives would have been underscored by the significant environmental
consequences, increased regulatory oversight, legal liability, and loss of community goodwill as a result of the East
Palestine, Ohio, derailment.
the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the Operation Respond Institute, and others.22 This
platform—which is available for use in both desktop and mobile device applications—provides
authorized emergency response personnel and primary PSAPs with accurate, continuous access
in electronic format to most of the train consist information contemplated by PHMSA’s proposed
revisions, including the following: the proper shipping name and United Nations ID number of
the hazardous material; packing group and placarding requirements and links to pertinent
Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) and safety data sheets; quantity and location of the
material on the train; car type, DOT specification, and location within the train; and the
emergency response point of contact for the railroad. Changes in train consist information are
uploaded to the AskRail® system from central processing centers operated by the railroads or
vendors based on data delivered via any of the following:
•

Voice reports from train crews;

•

Digital communications with mobile devices operated by train crews; or

•

Digital communications with automatic equipment identification (AEI) systems
(discussed further below).
Although AskRail® may currently operate as a “near real-time” system based on

associated use of AEI systems (i.e., there may be a lag between a change to the train’s makeup
and the update to AskRail® prior to passing the next AEI reader), PHMSA believes that it is well
within the capabilities of railroads operating under this system to ensure that updates to train
consist information are made in real-time, before movement of the train. To the extent that the
AskRail® system (or any alternative platform or methods used in complying with the final rule’s
requirements) may lack certain information (e.g., origin-destination information), functionalities
(in particular, the ability for railroads to forward information to pertinent emergency response
personnel in the event of an emergency), or extensive access requirements during emergencies,

See IAFC Comments at 3, 6; AAR, Doc. No. PHMSA-2016-0015-0007, “Comments Submitted by AAR re FAST
Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information by Rail” at 1, 3, 7 (Apr. 19, 2017) (AAR Comments)
(recommending use of AskRail® with respect to Class I railroads only).
PHMSA expects that such systems could be designed or modified and railroads could
proactively engage the response community to address those concerns. Although PHMSA
understands that current use of the AskRail® system may currently be largely limited to Class I
railroads,23 it is unaware of any fundamental bar to modification of that system (or for that
matter, the design or modification of alternative systems) to accommodate increased use by
regional and short line railroads.24 PHMSA itself commissioned a pilot program that in 2020
demonstrated the technical feasibility of integrating a leading proprietary commercial train
consist information platform for Class II and III railroads (the Wabtec Train Management
System) with the AskRail® system.25
Some railroads may also opt to reduce the risk of human error by employing automatic
means of updating the electronic train consist information. Some railroads already employ such
AEI systems consisting of identification tags mounted on each train car (locomotives, end-oftrain units, rail cars, and intermodal containers) and installed, trackside AEI readers (i.e.,
antennas) or portable, handheld AEI readers that record and relay switching of cars to the
railroad’s computer system. Installed, trackside AEI readers are placed at key locations, such as
the entrances and exits of rail yards; identify cars on a train by the tags on the cars as they pass;
and automatically relay information back to the railroad’s computer system to update the
electronic train consist information. Appropriate placement of installed, trackside AEI readers is
imperative for ensuring accurate train consist information is relayed to the railroad computer
systems. For example, in the 2005 Anding, Mississippi, collision, a contributing factor in the
confusion regarding the contents of the southbound train was that the last change in the train

See ASLRRA, Doc. No. PHMSA-2016-0015-0006, “Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0015 (HM-263): FAST Act
Requirements for Real Time Train Consist Information by Rail” 3-4 (Apr. 19, 2017) (ASLRRA Comments).
24 See AAR Comments at 3 (“Currently, AskRail® has the ability to show single car information for all Class II and
III railroads. If they choose to do so, Class II and III railroads can upload their train consist information so that it is
available through the app . . . .”). The AAR echoed ASLRRA comments that extending AskRail® to Class II and III
railroads would necessarily involve compliance costs.
25 See PHMSA, Notice ID No. 693JK320P000014, “Statement of Work and Sole Source Justification:
Transportation Management Consist Information” (Award Date May 14, 2020). PHMSA maintains a copy of the
project closeout report.
consist occurred between installed, trackside AEI readers.26 PHMSA submits that challenges
associated with identifying proper placement of installed, trackside AEI readers could be
mitigated somewhat by timely supplementation with one or more portable, handheld AEI readers
and voice reports by train crew personnel of changes to the local train consist information.

G.

How Has PHMSA Engaged Stakeholders?
PHMSA and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) had previously sought input

from stakeholders on the topic of electronic train consist information as part of the Rail Safety
Advisory Committee (RSAC) Hazardous Materials Issues Working Group. The RSAC is a
federal advisory committee established by FRA and is governed by the process and transparency
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463). The RSAC develops
recommendations for certain new regulatory standards through a collaborative process with all
segments of the rail community working together to find solutions to safety issues. The RSAC in
turn has assembled a Hazardous Materials Issues Working Group to develop recommendations
for changes and updates to the regulations for rail transportation of hazardous material.
In 2016, the Hazardous Materials Issues Working Group (hereafter referred to as
“Working Group”) met several times to discuss updates to the HMR’s rail transportation safety
requirements.27 On two occasions, the Working Group discussed the issue of accurate and realtime electronic train consist information and whether existing technology could achieve the
accurate and real-time exchange of train consist information. Several stakeholders contended that
the AskRail® system could provide the information required by the FAST Act. However,
representatives from industry asserted that some information required by the FAST Act
(specifically, origin and destination information) may not be relevant in an emergency response
situation and did not see a need to include these data in AskRail® entries; similarly, industry

26
NTSB Report at 6.
Meeting minutes from HMIWG meetings are available in the public docket for this rulemaking.

representatives also asserted that there was limited safety value in emergency response personnel
having real-time electronic train consist information unless there had actually been an accident or
incident. Some stakeholders also expressed concern that the limited access rights currently
authorized in the AskRail® system could limit its effectiveness, as the current version of the
AskRail® system requires rigorous security vetting for would-be users. In the event of an
accident or incident at a location where authorized federal, state, and local first responders,
emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel had not been provided access to
the AskRail® system in advance, access to train consist information may be unavailable to them
through AskRail®.
Additionally, the Working Group discussed the prevalence of installed, trackside AEI
readers and whether those AEI readers can provide accurate, real-time updates to train consist
information. That discussion highlighted a challenge in increasing reliance on installed, trackside
AEI readers to provide accurate, real-time updates to electronic train consist information—
namely, their placement across the nation’s railroad system is not uniform. All participants noted
that more frequent and uniform placement of AEI readers throughout the nation’s railroad
system would be required before that equipment could be relied on to provide accurate, real-time
updates to electronic train consist information. Although the Working Group discussed a variety
of potential approaches to address this concern—including supplementation by train crew voice
reports and a standardized requirement for placement of installed, trackside AEI readers within
three miles of each train yard (i.e., the location where rail car switching operations are likely to
be completed)—no consensus was reached on any one solution or suite of solutions. Further, at
least one stakeholder—American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), the
industry trade group representing regional and short line railroads—strongly opposed any
suggestion of a regulatory requirement for installed, trackside AEI readers in implementing
FAST Act requirements.

Following those meetings, PHMSA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) in 2017 soliciting comments on implementing the FAST Act’s then-effective mandate
to employ “fusion centers” as clearinghouses for receiving from railroads, and forwarding
electronic real-time train consist information to emergency response personnel.28 Although many
questions posed by PHMSA and written comments received from stakeholders were focused on
implementation mechanics specific to fusion centers, a number of entities submitted comments
speaking to other implementation dimensions of the FAST Act mandate.
AAR and ASLRRA29 repeated contentions made in the Working Group discussions
regarding the limited value of origin-destination information, or 24/7 availability of electronic
real-time train consist information for emergency response efforts. Their respective comments
also highlighted potential implementation challenges (pertaining to cost and gaps in internet
connectivity) associated with use of portable, handheld AEI readers, as well as the existing gaps
in coverage for installed, trackside AEI readers. However, the AAR comments ultimately
concluded that electronic train consist information could be a valuable option for improving
emergency response efforts, and the AskRail® system could be extended beyond Class I
railroads—even as they argued against mandating electronic real-time train consist information
as a substitute or supplement for hard copy documentation and bemoaned the potential costs of
ensuring regional and short line railroad participation in the AskRail® system.30 The
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFC) also submitted comments to the ANPRM
“strongly” arguing for the forwarding of electronic train consist information in the event of an

PHMSA, “Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Hazardous Materials: FAST Act Requirements for RealTime Train Consist Information by Rail,” 82 FR 6451 (Jan. 19, 2017). The fusion center framework was
subsequently abandoned in amendments to the FAST Act by the Investment Infrastructure and Jobs Act.
29 ASLRRA, “Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0015 (HM-263): FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist
Information by Rail” (Apr. 19, 2017). The ASLRRA comments explicitly endorsed the AAR Comments.
30 AAR “Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0015 (HM-263): FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist
Information by Rail” (Apr. 19, 2017). https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PHMSA-2016-0015-0007.
accident or incident, noting that the AskRail® system could—when supplemented by existing
hard copy documentation requirements—serve that purpose.31
On June 27, 2023, PHMSA published an NPRM32 on this topic, and solicited comments
from the regulated community and other interested parties on implementing real-time train
consist information. PHMSA extended the comment period for an additional 60 days.33 PHMSA
received 32 sets of comments to the NPRM, which are discussed in detail in Section IV below.
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting modified requirements related to the delayed compliance
period for Class II and III railroads; information on the origin and destination of the train; the
emergency notification required after an accident or incident; the railroad’s designated
emergency point of contact; and creating an alternate compliance method for Class III railroads
based on comments submitted to the NPRM. See Section I.C. above for a summary of the
changes made to the final rule, and Section IV below for a summary and discussion of
comments.

IV.

Summary and Discussion of Comments

A.

Summary Of Comments Received
PHMSA received 32 sets of public comments to the NPRM.34
Table: Comments Submitted to the NPRM
Commenter

Mitchel Berger
ASLRRA
Petrina Harrison
Sally Blake
Elizabeth Smith
Pinsky Law Group
Mark Nichols
NTSB
NENA/NASNA

Docket Identifier
PHMSA-2016-0015-0014
PHMSA-2016-0015-0016
PHMSA-2016-0015-0017
PHMSA-2016-0015-0018
PHMSA-2016-0015-0019
PHMSA-2016-0015-0021
PHMSA-2016-0015-0022
PHMSA-2016-0015-0023
PHMSA-2016-0015-0024

IAFC “Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0015 (HM-263): FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist
Information by Rail” (Apr. 21, 2017) at 6.
32 88 FR 41541 (June 27, 2023). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-06-27/pdf/2023-13467.pdf
33 88 FR 55430 (Aug. 15, 2023). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-08-15/pdf/2023-17472.pdf
34 This figure accounts for the two sets of comments submitted by ASLRRA, one of which was a request to extend
the comment period by 60 days, which was granted, and two sets of comments submitted by NENA/NASNA.
Commenter
Washington State Department of Ecology and Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission
Todd Jackson
Anonymous (PHMSA-2016-0015-0027)
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Ohio Department of Public Safety - Ohio Emergency Management
Agency
IAFC
SMART-TD
Amtrak
Coalition to Stop CPKC
Transportation Trades Department
The Attorneys General of Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland,
Delaware, Connecticut, Illinois, District of Columbia, Wisconsin,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont (hereinafter
“the Attorneys General”)
AFPM
Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials
Illinois Commerce Commission
Maine DEP and Maine EMA
Anonymous (PHMSA-2016-0015-0041)
Commuter Rail Coalition
Association of American Railroads (AAR)
ASLRRA
National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials
American Public Transportation Association
NENA/NASNA

Docket Identifier
PHMSA-2016-0015-0025
PHMSA-2016-0015-0026
PHMSA-2016-0015-0027
PHMSA-2016-0015-0028
PHMSA-2016-0015-0029
PHMSA-2016-0015-0030
PHMSA-2016-0015-0031
PHMSA-2016-0015-0032
PHMSA-2016-0015-0033
PHMSA-2016-0015-0034
PHMSA-2016-0015-0035

PHMSA-2016-0015-0036
PHMSA-2016-0015-0037
PHMSA-2016-0015-0038
PHMSA-2016-0015-0039
PHMSA-2016-0015-0040
PHMSA-2016-0015-0041
PHMSA-2016-0015-0042
PHMSA-2016-0015-0043
PHMSA-2016-0015-0044
PHMSA-2016-0015-0045
PHMSA-2016-0015-0046
PHMSA-2016-0015-0053

Overall, the majority of the comments received supported the requirements proposed in
the NPRM. In addition to the supportive comments, PHMSA received suggestions to improve
the proposed requirements, as well as objections, primarily lodged by AAR and ASLRRA, to the
proposed requirements. Summaries of these substantive comments, and PHMSA’s response to
them, is provided below.
PHMSA also notes that between January 22 and March 6, 2024, it held listening sessions
with some of the above stakeholders who had submitted written comments on the NPRM to
provide them an opportunity to elaborate on those comments. PHMSA has filed summaries of
those listening sessions to the rulemaking docket:
Table: Stakeholder Listening Sessions on Comments Submitted to the NPRM
Commenter
ASLRRA
AAR
IAFC

Docket Identifier
PHMSA-2016-0015-0048
PHMSA-2016-0015-0049
PHMSA-2016-0015-0051

Commenter
NENA
NASNA
SMART-TD
AFL-CIO TTD & Affiliated Unions

Docket Identifier
PHMSA-2016-0015-0050
PHMSA-2016-0015-0052
PHMSA-2016-0015-0054
PHMSA-2016-0015-0056

PHMSA notes that the above listening sessions generally recapitulated each stakeholder’s
written comments. That said, the discussions below identify any distinguishable comments from
those sessions.
B.

Applicability of Real-Time Electronic Train Consist Information Requirements
to Regional and Short Line Railroads
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to apply the same real-time electronic train consist

requirements to all railroads that transport hazardous materials in the United States. The NTSB,
Attorneys General, and International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation
Workers Transportation Division (SMART-TD) expressed support for the inclusion of regional
and short line—Class II and III—railroads in the scope of the rule. These comments noted that
the same types of hazardous materials are transported by regional and short line railroads as the
national Class I railroads and present the same possibility for significant accidents impacting the
public. NTSB additionally urged PHMSA to ensure that emergency responders operating in
areas served by regional and short line railroads have the same access to critical train consist
information as those that operate in areas served by Class I railroads. ASLRRA, a trade
organization that represents regional and short line railroads, objected to the decision to include
them in the scope of the rule. In its comment, ASLRRA stated that PHMSA lacks statutory
authority for this action; has failed to account for lower risks presented by these railroads; and
performed a faulty regulatory flexibility and cost/benefit analysis. Additionally, on January 22,
2024, ASLRRA met with the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS) and presented

verbal comments in support of their written comment. A meeting summary35 is available in the
public docket.
ASLRRA noted that the FAST Act, as modified by the 2021 Investment Infrastructure
and Jobs Act, directs PHMSA to implement a real-time electronic train consist information
requirement for Class I railroads, and does not mention regional or short line railroads in
association with this mandate, unlike other instances in the FAST Act that do specifically
mention these classes of railroads.
ASLRRA stated that regional and short line railroad operations are safer than those of
larger railroads, due to shorter trains, lower speeds and less complex operations. ASLRRA cited
data for the period 2015–2022 that indicates their member railroads accounted for 1.23 percent
of the total damages caused by hazardous materials releases in the rail mode, while Class I
railroads accounted for the remaining 98.77 percent.36 ASLRRA stated the majority of
movement on regional and short line railroads are at or below 25 mph, which reduces the
consequences of a derailment due to the lower amount of kinetic energy and could decrease the
chances of a derailment by allowing shorter stopping distance and additional time to detect a
visually apparent hazard along the tracks. Additionally, ASLRRA notes the 2005 incident in
Anding, Mississippi, which led NTSB to issue Safety Recommendation R-07-04, involved a
Class I railroad. ASLRRA also stated that regional and short line railroads, which operate in
much smaller geographic areas than Class I railroads, maintain close ties with local emergency
response organizations, making the provision of real-time train consist information in electronic
format redundant and potentially less effective than existing arrangements.
Further, ASLRRA stated there are substantial financial and operational barriers to
integrate regional and short line railroads into the existing AskRail® electronic train consist
system created by Class I railroads, and that PHMSA failed to account for these burdens

https://www.regulations.gov/document/PHMSA-2016-0015-0048
ASLRRA members accounted for $ 1.3 million dollars in damages related to hazardous materials releases in the
rail mode in the United States, compared to $1.06 billion dollars of damages caused by Class I railroads.
35
properly. ASLRRA estimated that approximately 100 regional and short line railroads provide
electronic train consist information to AskRail through Wabtec’s Train Management System
(TMS).37 ASLRRA identified an additional 210 Wabtec TMS users who do not integrate their
data into AskRail®, and would need to retrain staff and modify existing processes to integrate
data into AskRail®. ASLRRA identified a final group of approximately 200 regional and short
line railroads who do not use Wabtec TMS and would also need to modify existing systems and
processes to integrate into AskRail®. ASLRRA grouped these regional and short line railroads
together and stated that a total of 410 regional and short line railroads would be subject to
economic burdens associated with providing real-time electronic train consist information.
ASLRRA claimed PHMSA substantially undervalued the cost burden by indicating that
only 41 regional and short line railroads would bear significant economic burdens in the
preliminary regulatory impact analysis (PRIA) that supported the NPRM. ASLRRA also stated
that the estimate of $18,000 to obtain and implement a real-time electronic train consist system
and $5,500 per year to maintain the system was significantly too low; they estimated that a more
reasonable estimate was at least $100,000 to obtain and implement a system that would meet the
requirements of the proposed rule.
Finally, ASLRRA stated PHMSA failed to account for the unique challenges faced by
small businesses, including failure to propose a delayed compliance date for small businesses,
and failure to account for the overall lower level of technological integration among the regional
and short line railroads.
PHMSA’s Response
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting the scope of the requirement as proposed—all
railroads that carry hazardous materials in the United States must comply with the requirements
adopted in this rule. However, acknowledging the additional organizational and technological

PHMSA provided the funding for this integration through a grant in 2020. See PHMSA, Notice ID No.
693JK320P000014, “Statement of Work and Sole Source Justification: Transportation Management Consist
Information” (Award Date May 14, 2020).
challenges facing Class II and III railroads, PHMSA is providing a two-year delayed compliance
period for those railroads. This two-year period is intended to allow time for these railroads to
make the necessary changes to their operating systems and staffing to comply with the real-time
electronic train consist information requirements.
PHMSA acknowledges that Class III railroads have unique operational and resource
constraints that make the retention and real-time transmission of electronic train consist
information more difficult for these small businesses compared to larger Class I and II railroads.
Therefore, PHMSA is adopting an alternative compliance method for Class III railroads. This
alternative compliance method is discussed in depth below.
PHMSA does not concur with ASLRRA’s assessment that it lacks the statutory authority
to implement real-time train consist requirements for all railroads that transport hazardous
materials in commerce. Applying this rulemaking to regional and short line railroads is neither in
conflict with PHMSA’s statutory authority nor the FAST Act as amended. PHMSA also
disagrees that it failed to account for different risks presented by regional and short line railroads,
or that PHMSA failed to meet its responsibilities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act to reduce
unnecessary burdens on small businesses.
First, although the statutory mandate in the FAST Act—as modified by the Investment
Infrastructure and Jobs Act—directed PHMSA to apply the rulemaking to Class I railroads,
PHMSA has a separate general authority to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials.
The Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA; 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) at 49
U.S.C. 5103 gives the Secretary broad general authority to issue regulations for the safe
transportation of hazardous material in commerce. The Secretary delegates the above statutory
authorities to PHMSA at 49 CFR 1.97. PHMSA is utilizing this general authority to include
regional and short line railroads in the scope of this rulemaking. The NTSB, Attorneys General,
and SMART-TD support the inclusion of all railroads that transport hazardous materials in the
United States in this rulemaking.

Second, although the 2005 incident in Anding, Mississippi, that led to NTSB Safety
Recommendation R-07-04 involved a Class I railroad, Safety Recommendation R-07-04
recommends all railroads immediately provide real-time train consist information to emergency
responders following an accident or incident involving rail transportation of hazardous material.
Additionally, regional and short line railroads have been involved in serious hazardous materials
incidents in the past. These incidents include the 2012 derailment of a Conrail (Class III) freight
train in Paulsboro, New Jersey;38 the devastating 2013 derailment of a unit train of crude oil
operated by the Montreal, Maine, & Atlantic railroad (Class II) in Lac Megantic, Quebec;39 and
the 2023 derailment of a Montana Rail Link (Class II) train near Reed Point, Montana, which
released molten sulfur and asphalt into the Yellowstone River.40 Regional and short line railroads
move substantial amounts of hazardous materials—as of late 2023, six Class II railroads and six
Class III railroads had filed Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans with PHMSA, indicating
they transport or plan to transport a train carrying 20 or more loaded tank cars of liquid
petroleum oil in a continuous block, or train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of liquid
petroleum oil throughout the train consist.41 Regional and short line railroads transport hazardous
materials, and therefore their operations create a risk of serious incidents involving the releases
of hazardous materials.
Third, PHMSA finds ASLRRA’s argument that movement of hazardous materials by
regional and short line railroads represents lower risks due to lower speed and less complex train
operations unpersuasive. For example, ASLRRA’s comment fails to present information related
to the class of track used by these railroads when discussing low-speed operations. While
ASLRRA is correct that lower speeds are associated with lower conditional probability of
releases during derailments, operating on lower class track also is associated with a higher risk of

See https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1401.pdf.
See https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-r-es.html.
40 See https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/HMD23LR002.aspx
41 See 49 CFR 130.100.
38
derailment.42 Lower speed derailments do not eliminate the possibility of hazardous materials
releases during accidents—tank shell breaches, service equipment failures, and other causes of
hazardous materials releases can, and do, still occur with derailments below 25 mph.
Lower speed operations do not impact the probability of non-accident releases (NARs) at
all. NARs are typically caused by failures in tank car service equipment used to load and unload
tank cars, such as the tank car’s manway or valves due to poor maintenance, improper usage, or
environmental conditions. While many NARs are minor, some NARs create emergency
situations that would implicate the notification requirements adopted in this final rule due to the
volume or hazards of the materials released.
Finally, ASLRRA’s argument fails to acknowledge that a significant percentage of
regional and short line train movements do occur at the full operating speed for train equipment,
up to 70 miles per hour for a train containing tank cars, the predominant bulk packaging used for
the rail transportation of hazardous materials.43
Despite less complex operations and slower average speeds, trains operated by regional
and short line railroads have derailed and released hazardous materials with serious
consequences and likely will again. Therefore, PHMSA does not believe it is justifiable to
exclude these types of railroads from the scope of this rule.
Fourth and finally, PHMSA does not agree this rulemaking places an undue burden on
small businesses, or that PHMSA has failed to properly account for this burden. In its comment,
ASLRRA stated PHMSA substantially under-counted the number of regional and short line
railroads that would be subject to significant financial burdens. In the PRIA that supported the
NPRM, PHMSA estimated 500 regional and short line railroads are working with Wabtec (250

See Barkan and Kawprasert 2010 “Track with higher Federal Railroad Administration classes has lower accident
rates…” (https://railtec.illinois.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/pdf-archive/Kawprasert-and-Barkan-2010.pdf) and
Barkan et al. 2014. “The analysis shows that signaled track with higher FRA track class and higher traffic density is
associated with a lower derailment rate.” (https://railtec.illinois.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/pdf-archive/Liu-et-al2017-Freight-train-derailment-rates-for-railroad-safety-and-risk-analysis.pdf).
43See HM-251 pgs. 26683-26692 for further details on considerations related to train operating speed
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-05-08/pdf/2015-10670.pdf).
using TMS, and 250 not using TMS). In its comment, ASLRRA stated that 100 of their member
railroads are using Wabtec’s TMS and sending data to AskRail®; 210 use Wabtec’s TMS with no
AskRail integration; and 200 railroads are either not using Wabtec’s TMS or using a competing
suite of train management system software. Of the 95 regional and short line railroads that
PHMSA estimated are not working with Wabtec, PHMSA further estimated that 41 had fewer
than five employees, and would therefore face the highest compliance costs, primarily by hiring
additional staff to comply with the designated emergency point of contact requirement.
PHMSA’s intention in highlighting these 41 short line railroads was not to say they were the
only regional or short line railroads that would bear additional compliance costs, but that this
population of railroads would bear the highest percentage of compliance costs due to their very
small size.
PHMSA concurs that some Class III railroads may be unable to comply with the realtime electronic train consist requirements due to their very small size, which limits both the
number and type of employees available for their operations and constrains their ability to
acquire necessary technology. PHMSA also acknowledges that Class III railroads, which have
very short rail networks compared to Class I and II railroads, are in a strong position to develop
close relationships with emergency response organizations and primary PSAPs in their area of
operation. Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA is adopting an alternative compliance method for
Class III railroads, allowing them to comply with either the requirements applicable to Class I
and II railroads or this alternative compliance method. Wabtec data shows that many Class III
railroads already provide information to the AskRail® or could provide data to AskRail® with
only very minor modifications to their systems, and PHMSA expects these railroads will likely
choose to comply with the requirements on this final rule in the same ways as Class I and II
railroads. Otherwise, Class III railroads must follow all key provisions of the alternative
compliance method, which are listed below:

1.

Create a written plan that identifies the procedures the Class III railroad will follow to
provide emergency notification and transmit accurate train consist information in the
event of an incident or accident involving hazardous materials that requires a response
from local emergency response agencies. The procedure must assign at least one person
not onboard the locomotive with the responsibility to provide accurate train consist
information to local emergency response agencies and/or primary PSAPs in addition to
assigning this responsibility to the train crew onboard the locomotive, unless there are no
employees of the Class III railroad capable of fulfilling this function.

2.

Provide notification to all local emergency response agencies and primary PSAPs along
their route about the contents of the written plan (and any material changes thereto after
initial notification).

3.

Enact the written plan when an incident or accident occurs.

4.

Retain a copy of the written plan and provide a copy to authorized representatives of the
Department upon request.

5.

Conduct a test at least annually that demonstrates that the plan is effective for providing
emergency notification and accurate train consist information to local emergency
response agencies.
This alternative compliance requirement will provide an improved level of safety from

the status quo by requiring Class III railroads to plan for emergency situations and inform local
emergency response agencies and primary PSAPs about how they will provide notification of the
emergency and train consist information to the responding agencies. Class III railroads have the
flexibility to determine how they will provide train consist information. Example methods that
PHMSA anticipates Class III railroads may use include, but are not limited to, telephone call;
radio call on a pre-arranged emergency communication frequency; email transmission to a prearranged e-mail address; and physical handover of train consist documents. PHMSA emphasizes
the importance of training, especially function-specific training that complies with Part 172

subpart H, for any employee assigned the responsibility to provide train consist information to
emergency response agencies, whether an engineer, conductor, office staff, or other.
We also require that Class III railroads assign the responsibility for providing train
consist information to at least one person who is not on the locomotive in order to address the
possibility that the train crew is incapacitated or unavailable after the incident occurs. There may
be scenarios, in particular for very small Class III railroads with fewer than five employees,
where there is no employee capable of providing train consist information to emergency
response organizations except for those employees operating the locomotive. In this situation, it
is acceptable for the plan to only assign the responsibility to provide train consist information to
emergency response organizations to those employees on the locomotive. PHMSA understands
that Class III railroads operating locomotives without employing any office staff capable of
transmitting train consist information during train operation represent a very small fraction of
trains that carry hazardous materials daily in the United States.
Based on the information received from commenters and the creation of the Class III
alternative compliance method, PHMSA has adjusted the cost estimates in the final Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA) supporting this rulemaking in the following ways:
•

Updated the number of railroads to six Class I railroads, 14 Class II railroads, and 638
Class III railroads.

•

Removed the cost of assigning an emergency point of contact from the cost estimation
because Class III railroads are allowed to designate personnel in the locomotive as an
emergency response point of contact if there are no other employees capable of
performing this function.

•

For Class III railroads that are not currently working with a vendor and using train
management systems (TMS), removed the cost of producing and sharing electronic realtime train consist information and added the cost of the alternative method of compliance.

In conclusion, PHMSA will adopt the scope of the rule as proposed—all railroads that
transport hazardous materials in commerce in the United States must comply with the
requirements adopted here. However, in consideration of the challenges facing Class II and III
railroads, PHMSA will allow a longer compliance period for these railroads, and PHMSA will
allow an alternative compliance method for Class III railroads.

C.

Emergency Notification of Rail Accidents and Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed a requirement for railroads to promptly notify and

provide real-time train consist information electronically to every state-authorized local first
responder organization within at least a 10-mile radius of an accident or incident involving the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. PHMSA received numerous comments on this
proposed requirement. The Ohio Department of Public Safety (Ohio DPS), NTSB, and the
Attorneys General support the emergency notification requirement. These organizations stated
that providing real-time train consist information directly to local first responder organizations in
the immediate aftermath of an emergency situation involving rail transportation of hazardous
materials is the best way to ensure critical information regarding the contents and position of
railcars makes it to the responders who need it most.
NTSB and the Attorneys General additionally requested that PHMSA define “promptly”
with a specific time period within which the notification must be made. NTSB suggested
PHMSA expand the proposed notification requirement to include all accidents involving trains
transporting hazardous materials, even if no hazardous materials release was suspected.
Other commenters, including the Maine Department of Environmental Protection &
Maine Emergency Management Agency (Maine DEP & EMA), Association of Public Safety
Communications Officials (APCO), IAFC, the National Emergency Number Association/
National Association of State 911 Administrators (NENA/NASNA), the Pinsky Law Group, and
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Transportation Trades

Department (AFL-CIO TTD), generally supported the emergency notification requirement, but
requested substantive modifications or clarification to improve the effectiveness of the
notification.
Maine DEP & EMA and AFL-CIO TTD requested that PHMSA expand the minimum
notification radius beyond 10 miles to account for rural areas where there are no first response
organizations within 10 miles of railroad tracks, and to ensure the notification is also received
directly by organizations with mutual-aid agreements with the first response organization
covering the incident location. Maine DEP & EMA, AFL-CIO TTD, and APCO suggested
providing the emergency notification to the primary PSAP (e.g., 9-1-1 call center) that covers the
incident location, in addition to direct notification of first response organizations, in order to
provide redundancy and improve the chances that the notification and train consist are received
by the responding agency in a timely manner. IAFC and the Pinsky Law Group requested that
the emergency notification be made only to the primary PSAP to avoid confusion, and to align
with existing procedures for centralized command and control of response resources during
emergencies. Specifically, IAFC and the Pinsky Law Group noted that especially in metropolitan
areas, a mass notification provided directly to all response organizations within 10 miles could
create confusion among the recipients of the notification and prevent the orderly dispatch of the
proper response assets to the incident site.
NENA/NASNA and APCO cautioned PHMSA that while primary PSAPs are designed to
accept telephone calls regarding emergency situations, their capacity to accept e-mail or appbased notifications of emergencies, as well as to transmit information to responders, is limited
and not consistently similar across their network. In particular, transmission of information is
limited by training and technology, and could require substantial investment by primary PSAPs
to enable the transmission of electronic train consist information in graphical format to
responders in the field. They stated that while primary PSAPs must be notified of emergencies

involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials, they should not be relied upon as the
sole way to provide train consist information to responding agencies.
Several organizations that represent commuter and passenger railroads—New York State
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Commuter Rail Coalition, and the American Public
Transportation Association—requested that PHMSA include them in the category of persons
who must be notified if there is a release or suspected release of a hazardous material from a
freight train operating on their tracks. Amtrak additionally requested that PHMSA include them
in the category of persons who must be notified if there is a release or suspected release of a
hazardous material from a freight train operating on their tracks or within a 10-mile radius of
their tracks.
Washington State Department of Ecology and Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission (Ecology and UTC) and the Attorneys General requested that PHMSA adopt a
requirement for railroads to conduct periodic tests of their emergency notification system to
ensure the system will function in an actual emergency.
AAR opposed the inclusion of the emergency notification requirement as proposed. AAR
stated that the 10-mile radius is arbitrary, inconsistent with current emergency response
procedures, and not mandated by the FAST Act. AAR stated that the 10-mile radius is
inconsistent with existing DOT Special Permits for train consists maintained on electronic
devices, which require railroads to notify the emergency response agency having jurisdiction,
rather than every first response organization in an area. Finally, AAR made an argument similar
to IAFC and the Pinsky Law Group that the mass notification of all first responders in an area
was likely to create confusion and prevent the incident commander from exercising control over
the incident scene.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA appreciates the comments received on this issue. Based on the comments
received, PHMSA has determined the original proposal that required providing broad

notification directly to all local first responders within a 10-mile radius, while likely to be
effective in ensuring that the train consist information is received firsthand by the responding
entity, could also create negative consequences during the initial stages of emergency response.
In particular, the requirement to notify all local response organizations within a 10-mile radius
could disrupt the incident command structure by causing unneeded self-deployments by entities
receiving train consist information to the incident area and create confusion among jurisdictions
not directly impacted by the event. However, PHMSA concurs with commenters who point out
the value in a proactive emergency notification requirement, which provides another avenue to
share train consist information with the incident commander and aid responders in preparing for
arrival at the scene.
Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA adopts an emergency notification requirement but
modifies the required recipients to only the:
•

Primary PSAP (e.g., 9-1-1 call center) responsible for the area where the incident
occurred; and

•

Track owner (if the track owner is different than the railroad operating the train).
The primary PSAP is best positioned to receive a telephonic notification of an

accident/incident; receive an electronic copy of the train consist information; and then efficiently
provide the electronic train consist information to the appropriate entities within incident
command structure according to operating policy.
PHMSA recognizes that training, technology, and resource availability constrain primary
PSAPs, particularly in rural areas, and some may lack the ability to electronically transmit train
consist information from the railroad directly to responders’ equipment. However, PHMSA
expects that even in these circumstances, the primary PSAP is best positioned to identify the
responding entity to the railroad and serve as a conduit for passing contact information, verbally
if necessary, to connect the railroad and the responding agency. In addition, PHMSA provides
funds to all states through the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) grant

program that can be used to ensure PSAPs can make changes to train personnel and prepare for
implementation of this rule. In this final rule, PHMSA is also clarifying our expectation that the
railroad coordinate with the primary PSAP to provide the electronic train consist information in a
format that is readily accessible to the PSAP based on the information technology resources they
have available.
PHMSA, in this final rule, is adopting a series of adjustments to the proposals in the
NPRM—including longer compliance timelines for Class II and III railroads; annual testing
requirements for railroad emergency notification systems (§ 174.28(b)(2)); and requirements for
Class III railroads to provide to local emergency response personnel and primary PSAPs (and
annually test) written emergency notification plans (§ 174.28(c))—to facilitate collaboration
between railroads, emergency response organizations, and primary PSAPs in navigating any
obstacles to effective implementation of the final rule’s requirements. PHMSA also provides
millions of dollars of grant funding annually to states through the HMEP program44 that can be
used to prepare primary PSAPs to receive and disseminate this information.
Lastly, PHMSA expects that railroad trade organizations will (consistent with their
historical practices and commitments to public safety and environmental protection) serve as
resources to assist their members and other stakeholders in complying with the requirements
introduced by the final rule.
PHMSA emphasizes that the emergency notification to the primary PSAP adopted in this
final rule is the minimum requirement. PHMSA expects that during emergencies railroads will
work closely with the primary PSAP to identify the responding entity and incident commander,
and provide the train consist information to the incident commander as quickly as possible given
the circumstances of the accident or incident.

https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/working-phmsa/grants/hazmat/hazardous-materials-emergencypreparedness-hmep-grant
Regarding NTSB and the Attorneys’ General request that PHMSA define “promptly”
with a specific time period, PHMSA concurs that some additional specificity related to this
requirement would be helpful because use of the term “prompt” may not create the same sense of
urgency for all parties subject to the requirement. However, PHMSA’s position is not to adopt a
requirement for a specific time period, which may be too prescriptive for all circumstances and
not materially impact safety while diverting attention to whether the specific time requirement is
satisfied rather than whether train consist information is transferred to the appropriate persons. In
this context, our intent in the NPRM was that “promptly” meant that railroads must issue the
notification as soon as railroad personnel became aware of an accident, or incident involving the
release or suspected release of hazardous materials.45
Railroads should not delay the emergency primary PSAP notification to contact other
entities first (e.g., private hazardous materials response contractors). Notification and provision
of train consist information to other entities, like private response contractors, may occur
simultaneously with the primary PSAP emergency notification; however, the railroad must
prioritize notification and transmission of train consist information to the primary PSAP to
protect the lives of local first responders, emergency response officials, law enforcement
personnel, and other persons near the incident site.
Therefore, in order to communicate the NPRM’s intent more clearly for the emergency
notification requirement in § 174.28(b), in this final rule, PHMSA is revising the regulatory text
by replacing “promptly” with “immediately.” PHMSA finds this clarifying revision would better
align with current HMR requirements using the word “immediately” in similar contexts (e.g.,
§ 172.600 “Emergency response information conforming to this subpart is immediately available

See, e.g., 88 FR at 41542 and 41550 (emphasizing the importance of immediate availability of train consist
information for the railroad emergency points of contact); 41544-46 (emphasizing the importance of immediate
availability of consist information in the NTSB’s analysis of the Anding, Mississippi, accident); and 41546-47
(emphasizing the importance of the availability of avoiding delay in getting train consist information to emergency
response personnel in the “critical moments immediately following an accident or incident.”).
for use...”). PHMSA believes aligning § 174.28(b) with this existing language will better
communicate the urgency of the emergency notification requirement.
Regarding the NTSB’s comments suggesting that PHMSA require notification for
accidents involving trains carrying hazardous materials even when a hazardous materials release
does not occur or is not suspected, PHMSA’s original intent for the proposed requirement aligns
with this suggestion. Yet, because the proposed requirement was not clear to entities such as the
NTSB, PHMSA believes further clarification is warranted. The proposed language required
emergency notification in two circumstances for a train carrying hazardous materials:
•

Accident (e.g., a collision, derailment or fire); or

•

Incident involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material from a rail car
(e.g., release of hazardous material through an improperly secured tank car manway or
malfunctioning valve).
In this final rule, PHMSA adopts this requirement with an editorial revision to clarify that

railroads must send the emergency notification and train consist information for accidents and
incidents that would each require a response from local emergency response agencies. A railroad
must provide the emergency notification for any accident involving a train carrying hazardous
materials, even if there is no release or suspected release of hazardous materials, if the
circumstances of the accident require response from local emergency response agencies. This
will ensure that emergency response agencies are aware of the hazardous materials on a train
involved in an accident in their jurisdiction, even if those hazardous materials do not initially
present an immediate danger.
For example, the five tank cars containing vinyl chloride involved in the East Palestine,
Ohio, derailment and fire did not release their contents during the accident, yet their presence in
the accident area eventually resulted in a controlled vent and burn procedure several days later.
In future rail accidents and incidents, it is likely that similar situations will occur—specifically
that hazardous materials will not be released immediately but their presence will necessitate

evacuations or other specific emergency response activities to mitigate the hazards that they pose
even while still contained in their packaging. Notifying the emergency response command of the
presence of hazardous materials in a rail accident, even if those materials are not immediately
released, or suspected to have been released, is critical to ensuring that proper response and
mitigation resources are activated for the event.
Regarding the comments submitted by New York State Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, Commuter Rail Coalition, the American Public Transportation Association, and
Amtrak, PHMSA concurs that there is value in requiring a freight railroad to provide immediate
notification of an accident or incident to the track owner when a freight railroad uses another
railroad’s tracks. It is PHMSA’s understanding that many local first responders are trained to
contact the track owner when a rail accident or incident is reported, so ensuring the track owner
is informed of the event and also has train consist information at hand will increase the
likelihood that the information is successfully provided to the appropriate responding agencies.
Additionally, some commuter and passenger railroads, like Amtrak, employ authorized local first
responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel, who would likely be
among the first responders to any hazardous materials accident or incident on their tracks.
Regarding the comments submitted by Ecology and UTC, and the Attorneys General,
suggesting the creation of a requirement to test the emergency notification system, PHMSA
concurs. It is a logical extension of the proposed emergency notification requirement to have
railroads conduct tests of their system to ensure it functions effectively in an emergency.
PHMSA anticipates these system tests will create only a minor burden for railroads, and since
the number of tests and locations for the tests scale with a railroad’s network (i.e., a smaller
railroad with a small track network will require fewer tests to validate system reliability across
that network), the requirement will not create an undue burden for regional and short line
railroads. Class III railroads implementing the alternative compliance requirements adopted in
this final rule must also conduct an annual test of their emergency notification and

communication plan. PHMSA’s analysis shows that this requirement will create an average
annual cost burden of $19,843 for all Class I railroads combined, $46,229 for all Class II
railroads combined, and $149,393 for Class III railroads combined (2022 dollars).
In consideration of comments received and our analysis, PHMSA adopts a requirement
for railroads to test their emergency notification system or emergency communication plan at
least annually; to create and retain records of the results of the test; and to review any test
failures to determine corrective action to prevent reoccurrence. PHMSA is not adopting
prescriptive, one-size-fits-all requirements regarding the number and location of these tests. Each
railroad is best positioned to determine the number of tests and their locations required in order
to demonstrate that their emergency notification system is reliable and serves the intended
purpose to notify primary PSAPs and track owners of a hazardous materials-related incident.46
PHMSA is also requiring that in the event the recipient of the test notification does not receive
and acknowledge receipt of the notification, the railroad involved must conduct a review to
determine the cause of the test failure, and identify corrective action to avoid a similar failure in
a real accident or incident scenario.
In conclusion, PHMSA is modifying the emergency notification requirement to require
the railroad operating the train involved in an accident that requires response from local
emergency response agencies, or an incident involving the release or suspected release of a
hazardous material that requires response from local emergency response agencies, must provide
immediate telephonic notification and an electronic copy of the train consist information to the
primary PSAP responsible for the area where the incident occurred and the track owner (if the
track owner is different than the railroad operating the train). PHMSA is also adopting a
requirement for railroads to conduct tests of their emergency notification system or emergency

PHMSA notes that it expects that railroad operators will perform such testing in good faith and in a manner that
will be effective in light of the unique public safety and environmental risks they are best positioned to identify
along their routes. By way of example, annual testing verifying communications with the same primary PSAP(s)
year-after-year while entirely neglecting others along their routes would likely not be an effective approach.
Similarly, it may be prudent for railroads to prioritize verification of effective communications and response as
coordinated by a sample of resource-constrained primary PSAPs in rural areas along their routes.
communication plan, and create and retain records of the results of the tests and any necessary
corrective action.

D.

Defining the Recipients of Train Consist Information
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to require that railroads provide electronic train consist

information to authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials,
and law enforcement personnel along the train route that could be or are involved in the response
to, or investigation of, an accident, incident, or public health or safety emergency involving the
rail transportation of hazardous materials such that the information is immediately available for
use at the time it is needed. Separately, PHMSA proposed to require that railroads provide
prompt notification of an incident to state-authorized local first responders within a 10-mile
radius of an accident involving a train carrying hazardous materials or an incident involving the
release or suspected release of hazardous materials.
Several commenters, including the Ohio Department of Public Safety (Ohio DPS),
Attorneys General, Maine DEP & EMA, and Illinois Commerce Commission (CC) requested
greater specificity regarding the intended recipient of the real-time train consist information. The
Attorneys General and Maine DEP & EMA specifically noted that as written, the regulatory
language does not specify who determines which emergency response entities are authorized to
receive the train consist information, and further stated their position that all relevant first
responders must have access to and receive electronic train consist information, without
overburdening local PSAPs.
The National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials (NASTTPO) and a private
individual requested that PHMSA expand the intended audience of real-time train consist
information to any person or organization involved in emergency response to a rail incident
involving hazardous materials, including volunteers and those without “.gov” email addresses.
NASTTPO requested that PHMSA either remove the word “authorized” from § 174.28(a) or

clearly describe an appropriate authorization process for persons seeking access to real-time train
consist information. NASTTPO suggested several revisions to § 174.28, with the intention of
prohibiting railroads from excluding persons or organizations from access to real-time train
consist information based on factors like a lack of a “.gov” e-mail address, or membership in
non-traditional response organizations beyond the typical fire, law enforcement, and emergency
medical services agencies.
AAR requested greater clarity on the intended audience for real-time train consist
information, and that PHMSA narrow the scope to only those personnel directly involved with
accident/incident response and mitigation. Specifically, AAR criticized the NPRM’s proposals
for “seem[ing] to disregard the accepted, streamlined approach to emergency response as
outlined in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Incident
Management System (NIMS)” in favor of a “shotgun approach that sprays information out to
people that do not need the information and requires the provision of information . . . at times
unnecessary for emergency response.”47 AAR elaborated on this criticism by noting that in the
NPRM, PHMSA used the phrase “emergency response personnel” to describe the intended
audience of real-time train consist information in the rule preamble and defined that term as “any
personnel from any federal [agency] (e.g., PHMSA, FRA, NTSB, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), or Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel), or organizations that
state or local governments authorize to perform emergency response activities.” AAR stated that
this definition conflicts with the definition of “emergency response personnel” in 15 U.S.C.
2223e48, which defines the term as “personnel responsible for mitigation activities in a medical
emergency, fire emergency, hazardous material emergency, or natural disaster.” AAR requested
that PHMSA adopt this 15 U.S.C. 2223e definition as the intended recipient of the real-time train

47
AAR, Doc. No. PHMSA-2016-0015-0043, “Comments Submitted by AAR” at 3.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title15/pdf/USCODE-2021-title15-chap49-sec2223e.pdf

consist information, and specifically remove reference to federal agencies involved in postincident investigations, inspections, or management.
PHMSA’s Response
First, as discussed above in Section IV.C, PHMSA is, in response to comments received
on the NPRM, adjusting its proposed requirement to provide emergency notification to every
state-authorized local first responder within a 10-mile radius of the incident/accident with a
requirement to notify and provide electronic train consist information to the primary PSAP
responsible for the area where the accident or incident has occurred, and the track owner (if the
railroad operating the train is not the track owner) in a form they are capable of readily
accessing. This revision provides further clarity on the intended recipient of the emergency
notification, as requested by Ohio DPS and Illinois CC.
This adjusted approach better channels notifications of an incident/accident and safetycritical train consist information through primary PSAPs that are critical elements within NIMS’s
emergency response infrastructure precisely because they are well-positioned to identify
resources that can effectively respond to an accident/incident or which are most likely to be
adversely affected by an accident/incident.
PHMSA further submits that other measures adopted in this final rule—pertaining to
compliance timelines, development parameters, annual testing requirements for emergency
notification systems, and written emergency notification plans (each discussed in section IV.C
above)—will also provide opportunities for continual fine-tuning practical implementation
(including integration within NIMS architecture) of the notification requirements adopted in this
final rule.
PHMSA appreciates the comments from the Attorneys General, AAR, and NASTPPO,
Maine EMA & DEP, and a private individual seeking greater clarity on the intended audience for
real-time train consist information. PHMSA does not concur with AAR’s request to revise the
requirements of § 174.28(a) to exclude federal agencies involved in the investigation of an

accident, incident, or public health or safety emergency involving the rail transportation of
hazardous materials from the intended audience of real-time train consist information. PHMSA
is not aware of, and AAR has provided no evidence of, any real-world situations where provision
of train consist information to federal agencies or other emergency response organizations has in
fact hindered emergency response activities.
PHMSA stresses that this requirement does not require that railroads provide any federal
employee from any agency with train consist information. Certain federal agencies are involved
in the response to, and investigation of, rail accidents and incidents involving the transportation
of hazardous materials. Accurate real-time train consist information is critical to employees
performing these functions. Therefore, railroads must provide real-time train consist information
to those federal personnel who are performing these emergency response and investigatory
functions. This requirement does not impose burdens on railroads that work to the detriment of
emergency response. Federal agencies are not seeking preferential treatment, or special
consideration for access to real time train consist information. Federal agencies simply seek
access to real-time train consist information commensurate with their response and investigatory
mandates. However, PHMSA does acknowledge that since the term “emergency response
personnel” is already defined in a federal statute, it would be appropriate to consistently use
language that aligns more closely with the FAST Act mandate, specifically “authorized Federal,
State, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel”
when discussing the intended audience of the real-time train consist information in this
rulemaking.
Regarding the Attorneys General, Maine DEP & EMA, a private individual, and
NASTPPO’s comments, it is PHMSA’s opinion that the word “authorized” in the phrase
“authorized Federal, State, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel” means those persons authorized by an appropriate authority (e.g., a
town, city, county, state, or federal agency) to take part in the response to, or investigation of, an

accident or incident involving the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. PHMSA is
unaware of any single entity that performs this authorization process for all response
organizations nationwide.
As suggested by Maine DEP & EMA, state-level Emergency Management Agencies
(EMAs) have a substantial role to play in determining which organizations within a state are
authorized to respond to and investigate accidents and incidents involving the transportation of
hazardous materials by rail. However, PHMSA does not have sufficient information to require
that state-level EMAs, and only state-level EMAs, perform this function. PHMSA submits that
as a federal agency with the responsibility and authority to enforce regulations related to the
transportation of hazardous materials, PHMSA could serve as an informal arbiter of disputes
related to access to electronic train consist information.
Regarding NASTPPO and a private individual’s comments that PHMSA should
recognize the value of emergency response carried out by volunteers and members of
organizations not traditionally responsible for responding to a rail emergency involving
hazardous materials (e.g., health care providers), PHMSA acknowledges that in many
communities, especially in rural areas, emergency response responsibilities fall on volunteers
and non-traditional responders. PHMSA appreciates NASTTPO’s suggestions for revisions to
the language in § 174.28. PHMSA concurs that the variety of jurisdictions, legal authorities, and
scenarios regarding emergency response would make it impossible to define a separate
authorization process in this rule or fully discuss every possible eventuality in this document or
any associated guidance. However, revising the text of the proposed rule as requested49 is too
substantial a departure from the text of the FAST Act and the NPRM proposal.

NASTTPO’s suggested revision to § 174.28: In determining which individuals should have access to train consist
information via a software application, railroads may not limit access to only individuals with government e-mail
addresses. The railroads must allow access to individuals that can document membership in a volunteer organization
that may be engaged in emergency response activities during a hazardous materials incident. Such documentation
may include a letter from the management of the volunteer organization, local emergency manager, fire or police
chief, or a local emergency preparedness organization, such as the local emergency planning committee, state
homeland security, emergency management or transportation agency, or state emergency response commission. In
Although PHMSA is not adopting the regulatory language suggested by NASTTPO,
PHMSA cautions railroads that refusing to allow access to electronic train consist information
simply because the requestor lacks a “.gov” e-mail address is too simplistic. Railroads must
consider additional information and context, including a person’s membership in volunteer
response organizations and documentation verifying their authorization to conduct emergency
response on behalf of communities they support when determining eligibility for access to
electronic real-time train consist information.

E.

Maintenance of Both Paper and Electronic Train Consists
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to require that railroads maintain two forms of up-to-

date copies of the train consist information. One copy was proposed to be a physical, printed
(i.e., paper) copy in the possession of the locomotive’s crew—note that the HMR currently
requires this—while the other copy was the real-time train consist maintained in electronic form
off the train.
Ecology and UTC, AFL-CIO TTD, Attorneys General, IAFC, SMART-TD, and NTSB
supported the requirement to maintain both an up-to-date printed paper copy of the train consist
in the locomotive or with the train crew and an electronic copy maintained off the train. These
organizations cited benefits to emergency response by maintaining redundant copies of the train
consist information so that responders would be more likely to be able to access the information
during emergency scenarios when cellular data connectivity is lost or is not available, especially
in rural and remote areas.
AAR opposed this proposed requirement to maintain two copies of the train consist
information, including a printed paper copy document in the locomotive. AAR stated that

each community the first persons responding to an incident may be variable and may well be beyond formal fire,
law enforcement, and emergency medical services agencies. These individuals and each community should selfidentify to the railroad when obtaining access to software applications providing train consist information consistent
with the provisions of part (d).

proposed requirement exceeded the FAST Act mandate, was unnecessarily duplicative, and
provided no safety benefit. AAR stated that real-time electronic train consist information
maintained off the train is more accurate than relying on train crews to manually update stacks of
paper train consists, and that if the copies of the consist did not match, it would create confusion
during emergency response.
Finally, AAR stated that continuing to require printed paper train consist documents in
locomotives would prevent railroads from realizing economic savings and reducing their carbon
footprint caused by printing “millions of sheets of paper” and providing the electricity and ink
required to maintain printers across their network. AAR requested that PHMSA eliminate the
requirement for railroads to maintain duplicate copies of the train consist and allow railroads the
ability to choose the form of the copy of train consist information in the locomotive, including
the option of a paper copy, or maintaining a local electronic copy.
PHMSA’s Response
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting the proposed requirement for the train crew to
maintain an up-to-date printed paper copy of the train consist information in the locomotive. This
preserves the requirement that existed in the HMR prior to the adoption of this final rule. The
printed paper copy of train consist information maintained in the locomotive or with the train
crew has historically served as a critical resource for emergency responders during rail
emergencies, and emergency responders are familiar with this format of information. At this
time, the requirements for electronic maintenance and transmission of train consist information
adopted in this final rule will complement—but not replace—the local printed paper copy of
train consist information in the locomotive. PHMSA intends the crew’s local printed paper copy
to serve as a redundant backup to the electronic train consist requirements adopted in this final
rule. The printed paper copy provides information to the crew on the location and hazards of the
materials they are moving to protect themselves and others.

As noted above in Section IV.C, PHMSA has issued several special permits to railroads
that allow these railroads to provide train crews with an electronic device that is capable of
displaying and transmitting train consist information. PHMSA believes there is benefit in
exercising these “pilot projects” to allow more time to evaluate their effectiveness in ordinary
use and during rail emergencies before adopting this option into the HMR. In the meantime,
PHMSA will allow holders of these special permits to continue operating in accordance with the
conditions of the permits in order to gain this experience.
PHMSA may revisit this issue in the future, as we gain more experience with the existing
special permits and other electronic hazard communication projects. As such and for the time
being, we are retaining the baseline requirement that the train crew’s copy of train consist
information must be a printed paper document, and must be updated to reflect any changes in the
train’s composition due to pickups, set outs, or other work.

F.

Availability of Train Consist Information in Real-Time
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed that each railroad must provide electronic train consist

information in such a way that it is immediately available for use by its intended recipients. In
the NPRM preamble, PHMSA clarified the intent of this requirement by stating that the
electronic train consist information must be provided and be accessible to recipients prior to the
occurrence of an accident or incident in order to ensure it is immediately available at the onset of
response efforts. Several commenters requested clarification or modification of this requirement.
AAR stated that PHMSA improperly implemented the FAST Act mandate by conflating
the requirement to create and maintain train consist information in real-time, which they state is
required by the FAST Act, with a requirement to provide real-time information to authorized
recipients at all times, which they state is not required by the FAST Act. AAR requested that
PHMSA revise § 174.28(a) to state that the real-time information must only be supplied during
an accident, incident, or public health or safety emergency involving rail transport of hazmat.

The Attorneys General requested that PHMSA revise the regulatory language in
§ 174.28(a) to replace the word “provide” with the phrase “make available.” The Attorneys
General stated that as written, paragraph (a) appears to require railroads to send notification of
train movements and consist information to every authorized recipient at all times, which does
not appear to be the stated intention of the requirement. Ohio DPS supported the requirement that
train consist information be accessible at any time by authorized emergency response personnel,
in order to inform responders of the risks at the scene as soon as possible. AFL-CIO TTD
requested that PHMSA require railroads to proactively notify all PSAPs along the route of a train
and provide the train consist information to these PSAPs, so that the train consist information
would be immediately available in event of an emergency.
PHMSA’s Response
It is not the intention of § 174.28(a) to require that railroads provide proactive
notification about a train’s movement and consist information to every emergency response
organization or primary PSAP along the route during normal operations. This volume of
information would be overwhelming; likely could not be managed in a safe and secure way by
all recipients; and would ultimately defeat the purpose of the requirement by flooding authorized
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel with huge volumes of non-critical information that could be confused with the critical
information when an emergency event actually occurred. The only “notification” requirement in
this final rule is found in § 174.28(b), which only applies when there is an actual accident
involving a train carrying hazardous materials requiring response from local emergency response
organizations or incident involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material
requiring response from local emergency response organizations.

The intent of the requirement in § 174.28(a) is that railroads50 must create and maintain
accurate train consist information for all trains carrying hazardous materials, and must maintain
that information in an accessible or transmissible electronic format in such a way that it can be
used by an authorized person at any point in time (i.e., in real time). This ensures that the train
consist information is available prior to an accident or incident and can therefore be accessed
immediately when needed. PHMSA stresses the distinction between maintaining train consist
information in a secure manner for availability (i.e., at the ready) versus sending a notification of
train movements. The former strikes the balance between security and accessibility of
information while the latter is too insecure and unfocused to be useful.
In this final rule, PHMSA adopts the language as proposed, which aligns with the FAST
Act mandate. Specifically, this requires that railroads transporting hazardous materials must
“provide” electronic train consist information, to federal, state, and local first responders,
emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel along the train route that could be
or are involved in the response to, or investigation of, an accident, incident, or public health or
safety emergency involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials. PHMSA
acknowledges the Attorneys General’s concerns regarding potential confusion over the meaning
and usage of “provide,” but believes this preamble discussion adequately explains the regulatory
intent.
Regarding the method(s) used to fulfill this requirement, railroads have the flexibility to
choose how to comply with this performance standard. Most will likely use an electronic
database system, like the AskRail® system developed and used by all Class I railroads and some
Class II and III railroads, that allows authorized individuals to access real-time train consist
information with a query based on a railcar reporting mark or other train identifier. However, it is

As noted in Section IV.B and V.C, PHMSA is adopting an alternative compliance method for Class III railroads
that does not require electronic transmission of train consist information. Class III railroads may choose to comply
with the requirements in § 174.28(a) and (b) (requiring electronic transmission) or the alternative method in
§ 174.28(c).
not PHMSA’s intention to mandate use of the AskRail® system in the HMR. Railroads may
choose other methods of providing this information than standing up an electronic database
system, as long as they meet the standard in § 174.28(a).

G.

Timing of Updates to Train Consist Information
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to require that train consist information be updated prior

to continued movement of the train whenever a change to the train’s makeup occurs (e.g.,
addition or removal of railcars from the train) on both the train crew’s printed paper copy, and on
the electronic copy maintained off the train. The Attorneys General supported this requirement
because requiring updates before the train moves ensures that authorized federal, state, and local
first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel will have access
to accurate information at all times.
AAR opposed this requirement. AAR stated that there are areas of the rail system that are
not covered by any type of communication technology, and therefore the train crew would be
unable to update the central train consist information database using electronic devices or radio
communications in these locations.51 AAR requested that PHMSA revise the requirement and
have train crews update the copy of train consist information maintained on the central electronic
database “when practicable.”
AAR also requested revisions to § 174.26(b) to authorize means of notification besides
electronic or radio communication; replace the word “notify” with “synchronize;” and make
conforming edits to align with their request to remove the requirement that train consist
information be maintained in both printed paper copy format in the locomotive and electronically
off the train. See Section IV.E. “Maintenance of Both Paper and Electronic Train Consists” for
more information on the latter request.

SMART-TD, a rail labor organization, also confirmed to PHMSA that there are areas of the rail network with no
cellular data coverage.
PHMSA’s Response
It would defeat the purpose of the real-time train consist rule to allow the train to move
without updating the train consist information maintained off the train, which acts as the primary
method for providing electronic train consist information to responders. In the Anding,
Mississippi, accident (see Sections III. D. “How Does Train Consist Information Affect Rail
Transportation Safety?” and III. E. “How Does Requiring Electronic Train Consist Information
Affect Rail Transportation Safety?” for further information on the Anding, Mississippi, incident),
a change was made to the southbound CN train’s make-up, and the train began moving without
updating dispatch on the change to the train consist, which was a typical occurrence at the time.52
When the accident occurred, the train consist information stored in CN’s computer systems
reflected the train’s original makeup when it departed the Memphis yard, and did not reflect
changes made to the train’s makeup in the Greenwood, Mississippi, railyard—the setting out
(removal) of 21 cars and pickup of 9 cars. After the changes made at Greenwood, the train did
not pass an AEI reader before the collision occurred, and there was no way for the crew to
communicate the change back to the central system.
It took hours to provide an accurate picture of the contents of railcars involved in the
derailment to the responders after the accident because the crew was killed and the printed paper
copy maintained by the crew was destroyed in the collision and subsequent fire; meanwhile, the
electronic consist information maintained in CN’s database was not up to date. The intention of
this final rule is to prevent this kind of communication breakdown from occurring again.
Therefore, PHMSA adopts, as proposed, the requirement that the crew must update the
off-train electronic consist information prior to movement of the train (note that Class III
railroads complying with the alternative method adopted in this final rule are not subject to this
requirement because they are not required to maintain train consist information in electronic
form). If, for example, a railroad uses a system that involves AEI readers and changes to the

NTSB Report at 7.

train’s makeup occurs in areas between AEI readers and without cellular data coverage, PHMSA
expects that train crews will use methods such as voice radio or satellite communication to
provide updates to a dispatch center where staff can make the necessary updates to the master
electronic train consist to reflect the changes—the set outs and pickups.
AAR’s suggested revision to allow the train crew to utilize means besides electronic or
radio communication is acceptable. PHMSA encourages railroads to maintain flexibility around
the means used to update the off-train electronic train consist, where PHMSA’s concern is only
that it is updated and accurate before the train moves again. However, PHMSA is not adopting
the requested revision to replace “notify” with “synchronize” as PHMSA believes the proposed
language is the clearest way to express our intention that both the local copy of the train consist
information maintained in the locomotive and the remote electronic train consist information
maintained off the train are updated and accurate at all times before movement of the train.

H.

Applicability of Requirements to Freight Lines Operating on Commuter/Passenger Rail
Track
PHMSA received several comments from organizations representing commuter and

passenger railroads who own tracks that are used by freight railroads transporting hazardous
materials. These organizations—New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
Commuter Rail Coalition, and the American Public Transportation Association—requested
clarification regarding the applicability of the real-time train consist rule to their operations. As
described, the railroads represented by these organizations do not operate freight trains, except
for work trains engaged in maintenance of way activities.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA’s concurs with the commenters that the proposed language did not clearly
distinguish applicability of proposed requirements between the railroad operating a train carrying
hazardous materials and the railroad maintaining ownership of the track, and is therefore

editorially revising the language in new § 174.28 in this final rule. The intention of the proposed
requirements in the NPRM was to apply the real-time electronic train consist requirements to the
railroad transporting hazardous materials—i.e., the railroad operating the train.
In the scenario where a freight railroad is operating on tracks owned by a commuter or
passenger railroad, the freight railroad operating the hazardous material train is responsible for
complying with the real-time train consist requirements adopted in this final rule. To clarify this
point, in this final rule PHMSA is modifying the regulatory language in § 174.28(a) and (b) to
clearly indicate that the requirements in this section apply to the railroad operating a train
carrying hazardous materials.

I.

Origin/Destination Information
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to require that railroads include origin and destination

information with train consist information, in conformance with the FAST Act’s mandate. In the
NPRM, PHMSA explained its understanding of the “origin and destination information”
information requirement to mean the origin and destination of the hazardous materials on the
train subject to shipping paper information requirements.
PHMSA received several comments regarding this requirement. APCO and the Attorneys
General supported inclusion of origin and destination information with train consist information.
The Illinois CC requested clarification—specifically whether origin and destination can be
recorded as a city/county; or whether the information on the origin also would include actual
shipper information. IAFC supported inclusion of origin and destination information because it
encodes information on the direction of travel of the train, which can be difficult to determine in
the initial stages of a chaotic accident such as a derailment. IAFC explained that identifying
direction of travel is important for determining railcar identity, and therefore the commodity
contained within, during a response.

AAR opposed the inclusion of origin and destination information as proposed in the
NPRM. AAR stated the proposed requirement to include the origin and destination of the
hazardous materials carried on the train would be impossible to comply with, in particular for
multi-modal shipments. AAR argued that a similar requirement for origin and destination
information for hazardous materials is not required to be provided for any other mode of
transportation, and that railroads would not be able to obtain origin and destination information
from highway or vessel carriers performing the prior or subsequent legs of transportation.
Additionally, AAR stated that origin and destination information is proprietary information for
each carrier, and that revealing such information would compromise sensitive business
information about their own operations and customers. Finally, AAR stated that origin and
destination information is irrelevant for emergency response purposes and does not assist
responders in the initial stages of an incident.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA acknowledges AAR’s assessment that, as proposed, the requirement for origin
and destination information for the hazardous material contained in each railcar would be too
burdensome for railroads to compile and may be of limited value in emergency response
scenarios. PHMSA agrees with IAFC’s comment that the origin and destination information
encodes information about train direction, which is an important factor in the initial stages of a
response.
Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA is adopting a requirement that the railroad include
the origin point of the train (e.g., the railyard where the train was assembled), and the next
destination (e.g., the next railyard with a scheduled stop in the direction of travel). This
requirement maintains alignment with the FAST Act’s mandate to include origin and destination
information for the train and is responsive to AAR’s valid concerns about realities of information
available in the logistics system about hazardous materials on a train, yet still addresses IAFC’s

comment that origin and destination information about a train is helpful by assisting responders
with identifying the train’s direction of travel after an accident.
PHMSA stresses that this origin/destination data requirement is a minimum requirement
to assist authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and
law enforcement personnel to identify the position of railcars during the initial stages of an
emergency response. PHMSA expects that railroads and emergency response officials will
continue to contact and collaborate with hazardous materials producers through the emergency
response telephone number provided on hazardous materials shipping papers (see § 172.604) and
through dedicated industry response assistance programs (e.g., CHLOREP53).

J.

Emergency Response Point of Contact
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to require that railroads designate an emergency

response point of contact and provide that person’s contact information including name, title,
phone number and e-mail address. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that authorized
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel have access to a dedicated railroad contact who could provide emergency response
support including but not limited to having knowledge and response and mitigation information,
or access to personnel with this expertise, related to the hazardous materials included in the train
consist information.
PHMSA received several comments regarding this requirement. The Attorneys General
supported the proposed requirement because it would promote the timely sharing of train consist
information during an emergency. AAR opposed the inclusion of name, title, phone number, and
e-mail address for the designated emergency response point of contact. AAR stated that the
details of the name, title, and e-mail address of the emergency response point of contact were
subject to constant change as personnel changes, while a railroad’s dedicated emergency

https://www.chlorineinstitute.org/chlorep

response phone number, for example, would likely remain constant. Additionally, AAR
expressed concern that focus on the name and title of the designated emergency response point
of contact would take away from the quality of the information to be provided. AAR suggested
that PHMSA align the designated emergency response point of contact requirement with the
existing emergency response telephone number requirement that applies to the shipper of a
hazardous material found in § 172.604 of the HMR.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA intended the inclusion of the name, title, phone number, and e-mail address for
the railroad’s designated emergency response point of contact to increase a local first responder’s
ability to contact the designated contact person. However, PHMSA acknowledges that AAR’s
comments about the unintended consequences of the inclusion of name, title, and e-mail address
are valid. Therefore, in this final rule PHMSA is removing the requirement that the train consist
information include an emergency response point of contact include a name, title, and e-mail
address.
The purpose of the emergency response point of contact is to provide a link between the
railroad and response personnel for emergency response information-sharing and support in an
emergency. Railroads must provide a dedicated phone number and may satisfy this requirement
by designating a third-party organization that has immediate access to railroad information (e.g.,
train consist information) and is capable of providing supportive response information to
authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel during an emergency. If a railroad elects to use a third-party, it is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that necessary contractual/procedural relationships are
structured in a way to fulfill the emergency response point of contact role.

K.

Use of the Existing AskRail® Application to Comply with This Rulemaking
AAR described the AskRail® application that is operated by the AAR subsidiary, Railinc,

and stated their belief that the AskRail® application satisfies the major components of real-time
train consist information requirements mandated in the FAST Act.
PHMSA concurs that AskRail®, as currently implemented, satisfies some of the
requirements adopted in this final rule. The AskRail® application is designed to provide train
consist information in electronic form to registered federal, state, and local first responders,
emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel. However, PHMSA stresses that it
is the responsibility of each railroad transporting hazardous materials to meet the real-time
performance standards implemented in §§ 174.26 and 174.28 in this final rule. For example, it is
PHMSA’s understanding that as currently implemented, AskRail® is a “near real-time” system
rather than fully real-time because train consist information is not uploaded prior to train
movement in all cases, due to spacing between AEI readers. To be clear, sole reliance on AEI
readers in all circumstances would not meet the requirements adopted in this final rule to ensure
that the centralized electronic train consist information is always updated prior to movement of
the train.
PHMSA encourages the use of existing systems and services, like Askrail®, where
possible to meet the requirements of this final rule. The use of existing systems and services
reduces retraining needs for authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency
response officials, and law enforcement personnel, and reduces burden on railroads. However,
these existing systems and services may need to be modified to meet the standards adopted in
this final rule.

L.

Cost, Benefit, and Delayed Compliance Period
AAR stated their belief that the adoption of the FAST Act mandates for real-time train

consists will not be cost-beneficial. They noted that the PRIA break-even analysis stated the

rulemaking will be cost-effective if it reduces the consequences of hazardous material incidents
by approximately 30 percent. AAR expressed their belief that this was not possible. AAR also
suggested that PHMSA does not have a valid justification for exceeding the requirements that are
in the FAST Act mandate, such as the emergency notification requirement, because ultimately it
will not be cost-beneficial. Finally, AAR requests at least a two-year delayed compliance period
to allow Class I railroads to make necessary updates to their electronic systems without
unnecessary disruption of operations.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA does not agree with AAR’s characterization of the benefits and costs of the
rulemaking. First, PHMSA notes that this rulemaking responds to both a congressional mandate
and an NTSB recommendation; PHMSA’s evaluation of the costs and benefits of the rulemaking
were necessarily informed by that direction.
Second, AAR provides no information to support their claim that the requirements
proposed in the NPRM could not reduce the consequences of hazardous materials incidents by
30 percent, the breakeven point identified in the PRIA.54 Additionally, due to the changes
adopted in this final rule (see Section I.C. for additional details), the overall cost burden of the
rulemaking has been decreased, and PHMSA’s analysis shows that the breakeven point is now
about 12 percent. Serious rail incidents involving the release of hazardous materials are highconsequence, low-probability events whose harms do not lend themselves to easy quantification
as they can entail more than mere bodily injury or property damage (e.g., environmental and
mental health-related harms).
These harms vary as a function of which of the thousands of hazardous materials
regulated by PHMSA, each of which have their own environmental and public safety risk

PHMSA further notes that the premise of AAR’s argument here—that the benefits from mitigating
accident/incident consequence by making train consist information available to emergency response personnel
cannot justify implementing costs—is hard to square with its and its members’ decisions to make (significant)
investments in developing the AskRail® application.
profiles, are involved. Many of those harms, moreover, may not arise instantaneously at the
moment of initiation of an incident/accident initiation. Some may emerge well after the
incident/accident because of the unique risk profile of the hazardous material or because the
decisions made by emergency response personnel. There may be greater magnitude of harms to
public safety and the environment (e.g., by exposing more emergency response personnel)
experienced as a result of the accident/incident.
PHMSA understands, therefore, that immediate, reliable provision of train consist
information to authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials,
and law enforcement personnel for use in emergency situations will support site/hazard
assessment and onset of response efforts that can reduce likelihood of hazmat-related death and
injury, environmental damage, and property damage—including those consequences that may
develop in the moments following accident/incident initiation.
For example, in an accident scenario involving derailed tank cars carrying flammable
liquids or gases that are exposed to a fire, responders without access to train consist information
may approach too close to the tank cars during response efforts if they are unable to visually
identify the contents of the tank cars from markings or placards. If tank cars were to
catastrophically fail or begin venting contents through pressure relief devices while responders
are within the danger area, death or injury could occur from debris and exposure to the material
release.
Similarly, if the hazardous materials on a train required certain resources and emergency
response officials lacked resources, training, or personnel to ensure effective response, the train
consist information content and notification requirements will help ensure that emergency
response personnel can quickly identify those gaps and seek additional resources as appropriate.
The incidents in Anding, Mississippi, and Paulsboro, New Jersey, serve as examples of the hours
that can be lost during the critical early stages of a response when updated train consist
information is not available to authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency

response officials, and law enforcement personnel. Timely access to accurate train consist
information can help to reduce such negative outcomes.
Finally, PHMSA does not concur with AAR’s request for a two-year delayed compliance
period for Class I railroads. The NPRM proposed a one-year delayed compliance period, and
AAR has not presented any specific information as to why this is not achievable for Class I
railroads. Class I railroads have the resources, wherewithal, and expertise to be able to upgrade
their systems to comply within a year and any further delay in safety improvements is viewed as
unnecessary. Therefore, PHMSA is adopting the one-year delayed compliance period for Class I
railroads as proposed. As discussed above in Section IV. B., PHMSA is allowing a two-year
delayed compliance period for Class II and III railroads.

M.

Comments Beyond the Scope of This Rulemaking
PHMSA received comments suggesting changes to the NPRM that it has determined are

beyond the scope of this rulemaking. These comments are discussed in this section.

1.

Require a standardized format for all paper and electronic train consists.
Maine DEP & EMA, the Illinois CC, and a private citizen requested that PHMSA require

the use of a standardized format for train consist information for all railroads. These commenters
noted that different railroads have different formats and layouts for their train consist
information, which can make it potentially difficult for responders to identify the critical
hazardous materials information during an emergency depending on the format they are looking
at. Similarly, the IAFC requested that PHMSA identify which electronic application or other
service the railroads must use to meet the requirements of this final rule.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA recognizes that different formats and layouts for paper train consist information,
and different electronic applications create difficulties for authorized federal, state, and local first

responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel. However, it is beyond
the scope of this rulemaking to mandate a single format for train consist information or require
the use of a specific electronic application or service.
PHMSA encourages federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response
officials, and law enforcement personnel to take advantage of training opportunities, especially
those offered by railroads and through organizations like TRANSCAER®,55 to familiarize
themselves with the train consist information format and electronic systems in use by railroads in
their response areas. PHMSA provides grant funding for emergency response training through its
ALERT program56 to assist local authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency
response officials, and law enforcement personnel with this type of training.

2.

Emergency Notification for State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs)
The Illinois CC requested that PHMSA require railroads notify appropriate SERCs when

they provide an emergency notification of an accident involving a train carrying hazardous
materials, or an incident involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material.
Inclusion of SERCs is beyond the scope of this rulemaking because SERCs generally do
not have a role in the immediate emergency response to an incident. SERCs are responsible for
implementing the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (Pub. L. 99-499)
and are not designed to receive this kind of emergency notification, disseminate it, or act on it.
PHMSA notes that railroads may voluntarily notify SERCs of a rail accident or incident
involving hazardous materials in their state.

55
https://www.transcaer.com/
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/grants/hazmat/assistance-local-emergency-response-training-alert

3.

Require a Standardized Procedure for Maintenance of Local Responder Contact
Information
The Attorneys General requested that PHMSA develop a required procedure for railroads

to gather, maintain, and update the contact information for all local first responders within 10
miles of their routes to support accurate emergency notification.
As discussed above, in this final rule PHMSA is adopting a revised requirement for the
emergency notification. Specifically, PHMSA is replacing the requirement to notify all local first
responders within 10 miles of the accident or incident with a requirement for railroads to notify
the primary PSAP responsible for the area where the accident or incident occurred as well as the
track owner—if the track owner is different than the railroad operating the train. It is beyond the
scope of this rule to develop a standard procedure regarding the gathering, maintenance, and
updating of contact information for primary PSAPs. We agree that railroads must have accurate
contact information and geographic coverage information for the primary PSAPs along their
routes in order to comply with the requirement adopted in this final rule, and it is PHMSA’s
understanding that such information is already available to railroads.
However, PHMSA believes it will be more efficient and effective to allow railroads to
define their own procedures to comply with this requirement, rather than to create a “one-sizefits-all” approach in the HMR. Additionally, PHMSA is adopting a requirement for all railroads
to test their emergency notification system or emergency communications plan at least annually,
which will serve to demonstrate that each railroad is maintaining and updating this contact
information.

4.

Contingency Planning and Local Connectivity
Ecology and UTC, and the Attorneys General requested that PHMSA require railroads to

create contingency plans for provision of electronic train consist information to authorized

federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel in areas with no or limited data connectivity.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA believes that the system of hazard communication for the rail transportation of
hazardous materials, including the requirements adopted in this final rule, represents a redundant,
resilient system that will be effective in ensuring authorized federal, state, and local first
responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel have access to
information on the position and contents of railcars containing hazardous materials, even in areas
with no data connectivity. However, it is beyond the scope of this rulemaking to require that
railroads develop contingency plans for scenarios where the provision of train consist
information to authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials,
and law enforcement personnel required by § 174.28(a) fails due to local connectivity issues.
In this final rule, PHMSA maintains the existing requirement that the train crew must
keep an up-to-date local printed paper copy of train consist information in their possession. Next,
PHMSA adopts a requirement for railroads to provide an immediate emergency telephonic
notification to the primary PSAP responsible for the area where the incident or accident occurred
and provide a copy of train consist information directly to the primary PSAP so they can
disseminate further, as appropriate. As discussed in Section IV. C. “Emergency Notification of
Rail Accidents and Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials” above, the primary PSAP is best
positioned to understand the incident command structure that will be formed, which agencies
will respond, and how to overcome any local connectivity issues.
Finally, the existing system of hazard communication on rail cars carrying hazardous
materials, including placards (Part 172, subpart F) and markings (§ 172.330, including UN ID
number and proper shipping name or common name) on the rail cars used to transport hazardous
materials, remains unchanged in this rulemaking. While environmental conditions, such as
darkness, smoke, and firefighting foam or the destruction of hazard communication during an

accident can make visual identification of the contents of a rail car difficult, these marks and
placards continue to play an important role in hazard identification.

5.

Commodity Flow Reporting
The Public Utility Commission of Ohio and the Maine DEP & Maine EMA requested

that PHMSA require railroads to provide aggregated information on the identity and quantity of
hazardous materials transported by rail to state and county emergency planners. The NTSB also
noted that Safety Recommendation R-14-14,57 issued to the U.S. Department of Transportation,
remains open, and the requirements adopted in this final rule could potentially address this safety
recommendation.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA appreciates these comments and concurs that aggregated commodity flow
information is important for emergency planners. However, this request is beyond the scope of
this rulemaking. This rulemaking is intended to improve communication between railroads and
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel related to the hazardous materials involved in a rail incident or accident. The
requirement proposed in the comments would require reporting of aggregated hazardous
materials transportation data unrelated to a particular incident or accident, which is a
substantially different requirement, and would require additional notice and opportunity for
comment. PHMSA may consider this topic in a future rule. Emergency planners can request
commodity flow information from TRANSCAER® and PHMSA has grant funding available to
defray the cost of commodity flow studies.58

Safety Recommendation R-14-014 TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION:
Require railroads transporting hazardous materials through communities to provide emergency responders and local
and state emergency planning committees with current commodity flow data and assist with the development of
emergency operations and response plans.
58 See https://www.transcaer.com/resources/commodity-flow-studies and https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/aboutphmsa/working-phmsa/grants/hazmat/hazardous-materials-emergency-preparedness-hmep-grant.
6.

Training and Promotion of Availability of Real-Time Train Consist
AFL-CIO TTD requested that PHMSA require Class I railroads to notify every fire

department within their service area about the availability of electronic real-time train consist
information and how to access it. Additionally, they encouraged PHMSA to require that Class I
railroads provide training to first responders to ensure they are able to accurately read and
interpret train consist information in either in-person training sessions or via online modules. The
Attorneys General included a similar comment—they requested that PHMSA require railroads to
coordinate with the appropriate state agencies to account for state-specific needs for real-time
train consist information.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA is committed to increasing awareness of the availability of real-time electronic
train consist information and the availability of training in the use of this information to protect
human lives and the environment. However, imposing an additional requirement on the railroads
to promote the availability of the information and provide training is beyond the scope of this
rulemaking.
PHMSA plans to increase our outreach and engagement with the emergency response
community to publicize the availability of real-time train consist information, as well as the
resources that PHMSA has made available to receive training. Additionally, the annual test
requirement adopted in this final rule is intended to both increase local responder awareness of
the availability of real-time electronic train consist information and ensure that railroads can
reliably provide the information during emergencies. PHMSA also expects that railroads will use
the rule’s compliance period to engage with emergency response organizations along their routes
to prepare for implementation. Note that Class III railroads that choose to comply with the
alternative compliance method adopted in this final rule must inform all emergency response
organizations along their route about the contents of their written plan that identifies how the
railroad will provide accurate train consist information in emergency situations.

7.

Role-Based Repository
The Attorneys General requested that PHMSA develop, or require others to develop, a

“role-based repository” of real-time train consist information. Summarily, the Attorneys General
describe a centralized database containing all real-time train consist information for hazardous
materials moving across the nationwide rail system. Access to the repository would be governed
by a user’s role—e.g., a railroad would be granted access to the database to fulfill their
responsibilities to create, update, and transmit train consist information, while an emergency
response organization would be granted a different level of access so they could view train
consist information during an emergency scenario. The Attorneys General suggest that PHMSA
could host this database and provide role-based access to it to ensure that all authorized federal,
state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel
who need access to real-time train consist information are able to access it.
PHMSA’s Response
The creation of a centralized repository for train consist information is beyond the scope
of this rulemaking. PHMSA lacks the staff, resources, and legal authority to create, manage, and
secure such an extensive and critical database.

8.

Additional Train Consist Information
APCO submitted a comment that requested that PHMSA expand the type of information

included with the emergency notification of an accident involving hazardous materials or an
incident involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material. Specifically, APCO
requested that PHMSA require railroads to report:
•

Size and location of the release of hazardous materials;

•

Relevant placard number(s);

•

Information about individuals impacted by the incident, if applicable; and

•

Contact information for railroad personnel on scene in the event the designated
emergency response point of contact is not present at the incident.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA is concerned that requiring railroads to provide information on the size and

location of the release of hazardous materials with the emergency notification will slow down the
notification to the primary PSAP, because railroads would likely not have access to that
information immediately. One of the major purposes of providing train consist information to
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel is to allow them to assess the incident or accident scene safely and effectively. The
information requested by APCO would need to be gathered through an accident assessment,
likely conducted by local emergency responders themselves, and it would be counter-productive
and potentially dangerous to require an accident assessment be conducted before the railroad
could provide the required train consist information to the primary PSAP.
PHMSA emphasizes that these regulatory requirements are minimums, and PHMSA
expects that a railroad would take steps to share any and all available information on the size and
location of the hazardous materials release with the incident command, through the primary
PSAP or directly, as soon as possible to help responders assess the threats of hazardous material.
The four-digit number displayed on a placard, also known as a UN ID number, is already
included in train consist information as a required data point (this information is part of the
required §§ 172.201 to 172.203 shipping paper information). Again, PHMSA expects that if a
railroad is aware of which specific railcars within the train have been involved in the accident or
incident, and therefore the UN ID numbers of the hazardous materials contained in those railcars,
they will share that information with the primary PSAP and incident command immediately.
However, PHMSA understands that in the initial chaotic stages of a train accident, it is
more important for the railroad to share the entire train consist immediately and allow responders
arriving on the scene to use the unique reporting marks on the cars and their position in the

accident site to determine the contents of the cars involved in the accident or incident. Similarly,
information on the individuals impacted would likely not be available to a railroad immediately.
PHMSA believes the railroad should remain focused on sharing the train consist information as
quickly as possible in a directed manner, and not delay its provision to gather more information
on the scene.
Finally, it may be confusing to provide additional contact information about railroad
personnel to local responders. The train consist information includes a railroad designated
emergency point of contact, and that contact information should be counted upon to create a
reliable, simple single line of communication between the incident command and the railroad
during the initial stages of an emergency. Therefore, PHMSA will not require that railroads
provide this additional information. PHMSA emphasizes that the regulatory standards adopted in
this final rule are minimum requirements, and PHMSA encourages railroads to provide any
additional relevant information regarding an accident or incident to authorized federal, state, and
local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel as soon as
possible.

9.

Prohibition of Non-Disclosure Agreements
Ecology and UTC requested that PHMSA prohibit the use of non-disclosure agreements

as a condition of using an electronic system that provides train consist information to federal,
state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel.
Ecology and UTC state that if a non-disclosure agreement is required to access electronic train
consist information, as it is for AskRail® for example, some response personnel working for
state, local, and tribal response organizations that require their employees to comply with public
disclosure laws will not be able to use these means of information sharing. AFPM submitted a
comment requesting that PHMSA expressly prohibit the dissemination of emergency response

information to protect against unauthorized access by international or domestic terrorists seeking
to disrupt train operations and endanger civilian lives.
PHMSA’s Response
PHMSA will not prohibit railroads from taking measures to prevent the re-transmission
of real-time train consist information to unauthorized persons. In the NPRM in § 174.28(c),
PHMSA proposed to require that railroads must implement security and confidentiality
protections in generating, updating, providing, and forwarding train consist information in
electronic form to ensure they provide access only to authorized persons. PHMSA is adopting
those requirements in the final rule.59 PHMSA considers a provision that real-time train consist
information may not be disseminated publicly without permission to be a reasonable requirement
for railroads to include in an application to comply with PHMSA’s information security
requirements. PHMSA does not currently believe that this type of requirement unnecessarily
restricts legitimate usage of real-time train consist information during rail accidents and
incidents. Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA will not prohibit the inclusion of provisions that
require recipients of real-time train consist information to protect the information they receive.

N. Additional Notice and Opportunity to Comment
NENA/NASNA, in supplemental comments filed on March 18, 2024, requested that
PHMSA re-open the comment period of the rulemaking to allow additional time for stakeholders
in the PSAP community to review the proposed rule and submit comments. NENA/NASNA
states that, in their opinion, the NPRM comment period did not allow adequate notice for local
PSAP stakeholders to participate in the rulemaking process.
PHMSA’s Response

Please note that the security requirements have moved to paragraph (d) to accommodate a new paragraph for the
Class III railroad alternate compliance method.
PHMSA does not concur that this rulemaking action did not afford local PSAP or other
interested stakeholders in the emergency communication and response communities sufficient
opportunity to submit their views on the role of PSAPs in the provision of real-time train consist
information to emergency response personnel. PHMSA notes that since publication of the
ANPRM in January 2017, the mechanics for channeling real-time train consist information from
the railroads to emergency responders has been a principal area of focus of the rulemaking.
Indeed, the ANPRM posed a series of questions on how fusion centers would, in-practice,
interface with diverse emergency response assets—of which PSAPs are a prominent example.
The ANPRM also posed questions regarding current practices among railroads for notifying the
emergency responders of accident and incidents similarly naturally touches on the role of PSAPs
in those efforts.
NENA and NASNA submitted joint comments on the NPRM emphasizing the centrality
of PSAPs in emergency response, and calling on PHMSA to adjust its proposals because of
limited internet access for PSAPs; the revisions to the notification requirements in this final rule
are informed by those comments. Further, PHMSA held additional listening sessions with both
NENA and NASNA to afford opportunity to clarify further the comments already presented by
the organizations.
It is not in the interest of public safety to further delay the implementation of the crucial
safety improvements implemented in this final rule by re-opening the comment period.
Therefore, we elect not to accommodate this request. However, PHMSA notes to
NENA/NASNA that there are delayed compliance timeframes of one year and two years,
respectively, depending on railroad class, which will allow time for PSAPs to participate in
implementation. Moreover, PHMSA’s expectation is that railroads (especially Class I) take the
initiative to collaborate with PSAPs in providing assurances train consist information that is
provided to PSAPs in accordance with this rulemaking is then proven to be accessible to
emergency responders.

V.

Section-by-Section Review of Amendments

Parts 171 and 180
A.

Sections 171.8 and 180.503
Section 171.8 defines key terms used in the HMR. Prior to the adoption of this final rule,

a train consist was defined in this section as a “written record of the contents and location of each
rail car in a train”60—which PHMSA and industry have historically understood to refer to the
printed paper copy documentation maintained and updated by train crews pursuant to
§ 174.26(a). Prior to adoption of this final rule train crews were also obliged by § 174.26(b) to
maintain a paper copy of certain “emergency response information” specified in part 172,
subpart G, as well as other shipping paper information specified in part 172, subpart C.
As discussed in Section II.B above, Section 7302 of the FAST Act (consistent with
NTSB safety recommendation R-07-004) directs PHMSA to require Class I railroads to (in realtime) generate, maintain, update, and share certain real-time train consist information in
electronic form with emergency response personnel. That list of information specified in the
FAST Act is by-and-large consistent with the suite of safety-critical information in the
definitions of “train consist” at § 171.8 in use before the adoption of this final rule (which in turn
is aligned with the information contained in the notice provided to train crews at § 174.26) and
the “emergency response information” specified at § 172.602. In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed
to replace the term “train consist” with the term “train consist information” at § 171.8 to more
fully capture the intended meaning in light of the FAST Act, and specifically to mean a record of
information (as required by § 174.26) of the position and content(s) of hazardous materials rail
cars of a train.
The comments PHMSA received about the creation of the definition of “train consist
information” were generally positive and supportive. Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA

Mirror language appears in the definition of the same term at § 180.503.

adopts the definition of “train consist information” in § 171.8, as proposed. Additionally,
PHMSA removes the definition of “train consist” from § 180.503, as proposed. However, please
note that PHMSA adopts changes to certain information included as “train consist information”
in § 174.26. These changes are discussed in depth below in Section V.B.

Part 174
B.

Section 174.26
Prior to the adoption of this final rule, § 174.26 required railroads to provide each train

crew with a printed, hard copy document (i.e., a record of information) reflecting the current
position in the train of each rail car containing a hazardous material. This provision also required
the train crew to update the document to indicate changes in the placement of a hazardous
material rail car within the train. Additionally, § 174.26(b) required that the train crew must have
a hard copy of a document showing the information required by part 172 (e.g., shipping paper
information), and emergency response information specified in § 172.604. The HMR’s
emergency response information standards at part 172, subpart G, also contain requirements that
(1) pursuant to § 172.600(c), railroads and other carriers make that hard copy information
immediately available for use at all times hazardous material is present—by, for example,
making it immediately available to a representative of a federal, state, or local government
agency responding to an incident involving a hazardous material or conducting an investigation
that involves a hazardous material; and (2) pursuant to § 172.602(c)(1), railroads must maintain
hard copy emergency response information that is immediately accessible to train crews in the
event of an accident or incident involving hazardous materials.
Consistent with the FAST Act Section 7302 mandate, PHMSA proposed to supplement
those existing requirements by amending § 174.26 in several ways to ensure that train consist
information held in hard (printed) copy by train crews for all railroads is itself updated in realtime for accuracy based on changes in the hazardous material within the train consist, and that

train crews ensure that their locally-maintained hard copies match the electronic versions of the
train consist information maintained off the train at all times. Those proposed revisions to
§ 174.26 were as follows: (1) replace existing references in § 174.26 to the hard copy
“document” memorializing train car position in this provision with references to the hard copy
versions of the “train consist information” proposed at § 171.8; (2) specify the information to be
included as part of the “train consist information;” (3) specify that a hard (printed) copy version
of train consist information must be provided to train crews before initial train movement and
maintained in a conspicuous location of an occupied locomotive during transportation, i.e., when
the train crew is aboard the locomotive; (4) specify that train crews must update that local, hard
(printed) copy version to reflect changes in the train consist information at intermediate stops
before the train re-commences movement from those stops; and (5) specify that the train crews
must also update or notify the railroad to update the electronic form of train consist information
maintained off the train to synchronize with the local hard (printed) copy of the train consist
information employing (as appropriate) electronic devices compliant with the requirements of 49
CFR part 220.
In this final rule, PHMSA adopts § 174.26 with the following revisions to the proposed
requirements:
1. In paragraph (a), a revision removing the requirement to include the name, title, and
e-mail address of the designated emergency response point of contact.
This revision acknowledges that railroads transport hazardous materials 24/7, 365 days a
year, and it is not a reasonable requirement to include the name, title, and e-mail address of a
specific individual as the designated emergency response point of contact. Name, title, and
e-mail address information may change frequently and necessitate administrative updates to
information that may introduce inefficiencies or confusion if not properly communicated to all
parties, while a dedicated phone number for emergency response will likely remain static. See
Section IV.J. for additional discussion on this revision.

2. In paragraph (a)(1), revise the requirement for origin and destination information to
“point of origin and destination of the train.”
This revision is discussed in greater detail in Section IV.I. above. Although PHMSA
believes we have discretion to implement as proposed, based on commenter feedback we are
adopting a stricter reading and bringing the requirements of the final rule into closer alignment
with the FAST Act mandate. As noted in feedback by commenters, this origin/destination data
will still provide authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response
officials, and law enforcement personnel with important information about the train’s direction
of travel that can be used in assessing the threat of that hazardous material carried aboard the
train.
3. In paragraph (b), make a minor revision to allow train crews to use other means
besides electronic or radio communications to make updates to the electronic train consist
information.
This revision is intended to provide railroads additional flexibility as to how train consist
information is updated in the railroad’s centralized electronic database. To be clear, PHMSA is
generally not concerned about how the update is made, only that the update is made and is
accurate before the train moves.
4. In paragraph (b), make a conforming edit to clarify that Class III railroads
complying with the alternative compliance method adopted in this final rule are not required to
update electronic train consist information.
As discussed in Section IV.B and V. C, in this final rule PHMSA is adopting an
alternative compliance method for Class III railroads that does not require that train consist
information be maintained or transmitted electronically. Therefore, we are making a conforming
edit to this paragraph to clarify that Class III railroads that choose to use the alternative
compliance method adopted in this final rule are not required to update electronic train consist

information in real time, because they are not required to maintain electronic train consist
information.
Therefore, the requirements of § 174.26 adopted in this final rule are as follows:
(1) replace existing references in § 174.26 to the paper “document” memorializing train car
position in this provision with references to “train consist information” as defined in § 171.8;
(2) specify the information to be included as part of the “train consist information;” (3) specify
that a local printed paper copy version of train consist information must be provided to train
crews before initial train movement and maintained in a conspicuous location of an occupied
locomotive during transportation, i.e., when the train crew is aboard the locomotive; (4) specify
that train crews must update the local printed paper copy of train consist information to reflect
changes in the train consist information at intermediate stops before the train re-commences
movement from those stops; and (5) specify that the train crews must also update or notify the
railroad to update the electronic form of train consist information (if used—see Class III
alternative compliance method requirements) maintained off the train to ensure consistency with
the local printed paper copy of the train consist information prior to moving the train.

C.

Section 174.28
Prior to the adoption of this final rule, the HMR did not impose a crystal-clear

requirement for railroads to ensure that safety-critical train consist information is available to
emergency response personnel at all times, much less placed in the hands of emergency response
personnel during an accident or incident involving rail transportation of hazardous material.
Rather, the HMR instructs in terms of making such information “accessible” to train crews
(§ 172.602(c)), “available” to first responders, emergency response officials, or law enforcement
personnel (§ 172.600(c)), in the possession of train crews (§ 174.26(a)), and submitted to the
National Response Center “as soon as practical but no later than 12 hours after the occurrence of
any incident . . .” (§ 171.15).

Section 7302 of the FAST Act requires PHMSA to issue regulations to supplement the
aforementioned requirements by creating an explicit obligation for railroads to “provide”
accurate, real-time train consist information in electronic form to authorized federal, state, and
local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel involved in
a rail accident or incident involving transportation of hazardous materials. As discussed in
Section IV.F. above, PHMSA understands that the congressional mandate to “provide” real-time
train consist information requires that railroads take concrete action both: (1) by making that
electronic train consist information available to emergency response personnel at all times,
including before an accident or incident occurs; and (2) immediately after an accident or
incident, ensuring that railroads take action to provide emergency notification and train consist
information.
PHMSA consequently proposed a new § 174.28 implementing that FAST Act mandate.
For the same reasons described in the above discussion of the proposed § 174.26, PHMSA
proposed that this new provision’s requirements would apply to all railroads, and not just those
that were the subject of the FAST Act mandate. However, in this final rule, PHMSA is adopting
an alternative compliance method that does not require train consists to be maintained or
transmitted in electronic form for Class III railroads, due to their small size and closer integration
with local emergency response resources. Consistent with PHMSA’s understanding of
congressional intent, paragraph (a) of this section requires railroads to ensure that authorized
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel along routes in which they transport hazardous material have access to up-to-date,
electronic real-time train consist information at any time—including before an accident or
incident occurs.
PHMSA notes that this element of its new information-sharing requirements can help to
address concerns regarding the effectiveness of any requirement for only post-accident/incident
notification arising from: (1) internet or phone connectivity gaps/intermittency; or (2) delayed or

incomplete distribution of real-time electronic train consist by railroad personnel who may be
juggling many tasks following reports of an accident or incident involving rail transportation of
hazardous material. As discussed above in Sections III.F.-G., PHMSA understands that the
industry may already have tools (including the AskRail® system) that could be employed for this
purpose without material modification—or could develop new platforms for this purpose.
In the final rule, PHMSA is adopting paragraph (a) as proposed, with a minor revision to
clarify that the party responsible for compliance is the railroad operating a train carrying
hazardous materials, rather than the track owner—if the track owner is different than the railroad
operating the train.
For paragraph (b) within the new § 174.28, PHMSA proposed to establish an obligation
for all railroads to supplement the above advance information sharing requirement with an
explicit obligation for railroads to “push” electronic train consist information to state-authorized
local first responders within a 10-mile radius of an accident or certain incidents promptly
following the accident or incident. In this final rule, PHMSA is revising the proposed
requirement. PHMSA is replacing the proposed requirement to provide emergency notification to
all state-authorized local first responders within a 10-mile radius of an accident or incident with a
requirement to provide telephonic emergency notification and an electronic copy of train consist
information to the primary PSAP responsible for the area where the accident or incident occurred
and, separately, to the track owner (if the track owner is different than the railroad operating the
train). This notification would be largely similar to the special permit conditions discussed in
Section III.C. above. The decision to change the recipient of the emergency notification from all
local first responders within a 10-mile radius to the primary PSAP responsible for the accident or
incident location and the track owner is discussed in greater detail in Section IV.C above.
At its core, this requirement is performance-based—in scrutinizing compliance with this
requirement, PHMSA will focus on: (1) before an accident or incident, ensuring that railroads
have adopted protocols and resources providing a high degree of confidence that the emergency

notifications will succeed in immediately placing train consist information in the hands of a
primary PSAP or track owner; and (2) after an accident or incident occurs, that those
notifications did in fact reach the intended audience in a timely manner.61
Similarly, PHMSA will be less concerned with the particular tools used to provide
electronic train consist information to the primary PSAP or track owner after the initial telephone
notification of the incident or accident (e.g., instant message to mobile devices, e-mail, fax
notification functionalities within the AskRail® system) than whether railroads have ensured
that: (1) their personnel have, in advance of rail transportation of hazardous material, a
comprehensive, verified list with pertinent contact information for primary PSAPs and other
track owners (if applicable) along a route; and (2) appropriate protocols and training for railroad
personnel to ensure that such emergency notifications can occur immediately following an
accident or incident. To verify that each railroad has a system in place to meet this performancebased approach, PHMSA is adopting a new requirement in paragraph (b)(2) for railroads to
conduct annual tests of their emergency notification system. These tests must be sufficient in
number and location to ensure reliability across the railroad’s network.
PHMSA also is adopting a recordkeeping requirement in association with the test
requirement to require railroads to create a record of each test to include: (1) the date of the test;
(2) the method used to provide the notification; (3) the name and location of the primary PSAP
or track owner to whom the notification was sent; (4) whether or not the test notification was
received and acknowledged; and (5) for system tests that are not received and acknowledged, an
analysis of the factors contributing to the failure and corrective actions taken by the railroad to
prevent such a failure from recurring. Test records must be retained for at least five years.

PHMSA expects that railroads will not approach their “push” notification requirement as a check-the-box exercise
whereby their regulatory obligation is discharged when they send an e-mail or leave a voicemail with emergency
response personnel. Rather, PHMSA expects that they will continue to attempt to contact emergency response
personnel by a variety of means until they receive positive (non-automated) receipt of the notification by those
personnel.
Finally, PHMSA is replacing the word “promptly” with “immediately” in this paragraph
in order to more clearly communicate our intent that the railroad operating the train provide the
emergency notification and train consist information as quickly as possible.
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting an alternative compliance method for Class III
railroads that does not require the transmission of electronic train consists to authorized federal,
state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel.
Class III railroads may either comply with the electronic real-time train consist and emergency
notification requirements adopted in paragraphs (a) and (b), or they may comply with the
alternative method adopted in § 174.28(c).
The alternative method requires a Class III railroad to develop a written plan that
describes how the railroad will notify local emergency response organizations about an incident
or accident involving hazardous materials that requires an emergency response. This plan must
also describe how the Class III railroad will provide accurate, updated train consist information
to local emergency responders, and must assign the responsibility for providing this information
to at least one person not on board a locomotive, unless there are no such employees of the Class
III railroad capable of performing this function. PHMSA expects that only the smallest of Class
III railroads would be unable to assign an office employee with this responsibility; provide this
employee with any necessary training; and ensure at least one such employee is available to
communicate with emergency responders in the event of an emergency situation during all train
movements. Class III railroads must inform all local emergency response agencies along their
route about the contents of the plan. In the event of an accident involving a train carrying
hazardous materials requiring response from local emergency response agencies, or an incident
involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material from a rail car in the train
requiring response from local emergency response agencies, the Class III railroad must
immediately notify the primary PSAP responsible for the area where the incident or accident
occurred telephonically, and enact their plan to provide accurate, updated train consist

information to appropriate emergency response agencies. Class III railroads must retain a copy of
this plan and provide it to authorized representatives of the Department upon request. Finally,
Class III railroads must conduct a test at least annually to demonstrate the effectiveness of their
written plan. The Class III railroad must retain a record of each test event, and, in the event of a
failed test, conduct an analysis of contributing factors and revise the plan accordingly to avoid
such a failure in a real emergency situation.
PHMSA also proposed a new paragraph (c) implementing the FAST Act mandate that the
exchange of real-time electronic train consist information must be performed in a secure and
confidential manner so as to protect proprietary and security-sensitive information,62 and that
regional and short line railroads be permitted to enter into memoranda of understanding with
Class I railroads whose track they use to facilitate such transfers of train consist information to
emergency response personnel63 and directed toward information-sharing and identification of
best practices. Those industry initiatives are backstopped by recent guidance issued by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in October 202264 directing most railroads to
undertake a series of measures to reduce the risk of cybersecurity threats to their operations.
PHMSA expects that railroads will be able to build on those existing resources to ensure
that their execution of the requirements adopted in this final rule are compliant with the security
requirements adopted in this final rule. Further, PHMSA notes that nothing in this rulemaking
would restrict railroads from collaborating on a platform (e.g., the AskRail® system) for
electronic sharing of accurate and real-time train consist information with authorized emergency
response personnel, whether pursuant to a memorandum of understanding or other form of
agreement. Therefore, PHMSA is adopting the requirements of paragraph (c) as proposed;

PHMSA acknowledges that the precise statutory language employed in Section 7302(a)(5) of the FAST Act
(“security-sensitive information”) differs slightly from the language (“Sensitive Security Information”) employed in
the Transportation Security Administration directive referenced below and in regulation at 49 CFR parts 15 and
1520.
63 Among the members of the Railroad Information Security Committee are the chief information security officers
of several Class I railroads, Amtrak, Railinc. The Committee is supported by each of AAR and ASLRRA.
64 TSA, Sec. Dir. No. 1580/82-2022-01, “Rail Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions and Testing” (Oct. 2022), sd-158082-2022-01.pdf (tsa.gov).
however, PHMSA is redesignating this paragraph as (d) to accommodate the alternative
compliance method adopted for Class III railroads.
Lastly, in the NPRM, PHMSA included proposed language at paragraph (d) that would
prohibit railroads and their personnel (or their designees) from withholding or causing to
withhold electronic train consist information from emergency response personnel responding to
an incident or accident. PHMSA’s proposed regulatory language elaborated that railroads
employing technology for such notifications must ensure that any such emergency response
personnel have access to that software and the train consist information therein throughout the
accident or incident—from the initial notification pursuant to § 174.28(b) until the conclusion of
response and investigation efforts. PHMSA submits that this proposed language is another
essential measure for backstopping both the obligation for railroads to provide accurate, realtime train consist information in electronic form in paragraph (a) and the accident/incident
notification performance standard at paragraph (b). PHMSA is adopting the requirements of
paragraph (d) as proposed; however, PHMSA is redesignating this paragraph as (e) to
accommodate the alternative compliance method adopted for Class III railroads.

VI.

Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A.

Statutory/Legal Authority for this Rulemaking
Statutory authority for this rulemaking is provided by the federal hazardous materials

transportation law (HMTA; 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.). As discussed at greater length in Section
II.B. above, Section 5103(b) of the HMTA authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
“prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous materials in
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.” The Secretary has delegated this authority under
the HMTA to the PHMSA Administrator at 49 CFR 1.97(b).

B.

Executive Orders 12866 and 14094, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866 (“Regulatory Planning and Review”),65 as amended by Executive

Order 14094 (“Modernizing Regulatory Review”),66 requires that agencies “should assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not
regulating.” Agencies should consider quantifiable measures and qualitative measures of costs
and benefits that are difficult to quantify. Further, Executive Order 12866 requires that “agencies
should select those [regulatory] approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts;
and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.” Similarly, DOT Order
2100.6A (“Rulemaking and Guidance Procedures”) requires that regulations issued by PHMSA
and other DOT Operating Administrations should consider an assessment of the potential
benefits, costs, and other important impacts of the proposed action and should quantify (to the
extent practicable) the benefits, costs, and any significant distributional impacts, including any
environmental impacts.
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Order 2100.6A require that PHMSA submit
“significant regulatory actions” to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.
This rulemaking is not considered a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866 (as amended) and, therefore, was not formally reviewed by OMB. This rulemaking
is also not considered a significant rule under DOT Order 2100.6A.
The following is a brief summary and table of costs, savings, and net benefits of some of
the amendments adopted in this final rule. PHMSA has developed a more detailed economic
analysis in the final RIA, a copy of which has been placed in the docket.
PHMSA has determined that the final rule impacts six Class I railroads, 14 Class II
railroads, and 638 Class III railroads, and estimates the undiscounted total financial impact of the

65
58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
88 FR 21879 (April 11, 2023).

rule over a 10-year analysis period to be about $17.7 million in 2022 dollars, for an average
annual cost of $1.8 million. The discounted total cost of the rule over the analysis period is
estimated to be $15.8 million in 2022 dollars at a two percent discount rate, for an average
annual cost of $1.6 million. Further, PHMSA notes that the benefits of the action are difficult to
quantify as it is reliant on the degree to which having real-time access to train consist
information improves authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response
officials, and law enforcement personnel’s ability to respond to rail incidents.
Based on lessons learned from major hazardous material incidents on rail, PHMSA
anticipates the action would improve authorized federal, state, and local first responders,
emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel’s ability to promptly identify all
rail cars containing hazardous materials, as well as the specific hazardous material contained
therein, that are involved in an accident or investigation, and to assess the threat from a
hazardous materials release in a timely manner. This would likely reduce injuries and fatalities,
material loss and response costs, and delays caused by closures to major transportation routes.
PHMSA estimated the annual damage cost of hazardous material incidents on rail that could be
impacted by this action to be about 15 million in 2022 dollars. Therefore, the final rule would
have to reduce damage costs by about 12 percent for the monetized benefits of the final rule to
equal costs. The following table summarizes the quantified annual costs and qualified benefits of
the major provisions of this rulemaking.

Requirement

Average Annual Cost
Undiscounted
2%

Amending the
definition of
train consist
information

$327,847

$291,089

Amending
notice to train
crew

$1,169,018

$1,036,601

Benefit

Breakeven

By aligning the definition of
the FAST Act with the
language in the existing
regulation, this amendment
improves regulatory clarity.
By improving emergency
personnel’s ability to
promptly identify all the

Cost-effective if
this requirement
reduces the
consequences of
hazardous
material incidents
by rail by about
11.8 percent.

New
emergency
response
information
sharing
requirement
Total

$275,018

$251,219

$1,771,883

$1,578,908

hazardous materials
involved in an accident and
assess the threat from a
hazardous materials release,
the provisions will reduce
injuries and fatalities,
material loss and response
costs, and delays caused by
closures.

As illustrated by the Norfolk Southern train derailment at East Palestine, Ohio, such
incidents can have substantial consequences that are not captured by this regulatory impact
analysis, including the long-term environmental concerns and health risks (both physiological
and psychological) for residents. Research also shows that such incidents can have significant
impacts on property values, which, in turn, can slow down economic activity in the area.67
Additionally, of the 140,000 total route miles of track in the United States, 104,000 miles are in
rural and tribal areas, suggesting that train related hazardous material incidents mainly happen in
areas populated by disadvantaged communities.68 Time is of the essence during the initial stages
of emergency response to a hazardous materials incident. Reducing the lag in provision of
critical hazardous material identification and response information during rail hazardous
materials incidents will provide environmental and safety benefits, although these benefits are
difficult to quantify. PHMSA acknowledges and considers these unquantified benefits in
selecting the provisions of the rulemaking.

For example, a study that examines the impact of 33 derailments involving hazardous material on property values
in New York State between 2004 and 2013 found that, on average, a derailment depreciates housing values within a
one-mile radius by five to eight percent (Chuan Tang et al. (2020). Rail accidents and property values in the era of
unconventional energy production. Journal of Urban Economics, 120, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2020.103295
68 Improving Rail in Rural Communities  FRA (dot.gov)
C.

Executive Order 13132
PHMSA analyzed this rulemaking in accordance with the principles and criteria

contained in Executive Order 13132 (“Federalism”)69 and the presidential memorandum
(“Preemption”).70 Executive Order 13132 requires agencies to assure meaningful and timely
input by state and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that may have
“substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.”
The federal hazardous materials transportation law contains an express preemption
provision at 49 U.S.C. 5125(a) in the event compliance with a state, local, or tribal requirement
is not possible or presents an obstacle to compliance. Additionally, the federal hazardous
materials transportation law contains an express preemption provision at 49 U.S.C.5125(b) that
preempts state, local, and tribal requirements on the following covered subjects:
1. Designation, description, and classification of hazardous materials;
2. Packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and placarding of hazardous materials;
3. Preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents related to hazardous materials and
requirements related to the number, contents, and placement of those documents;
4. Written notification, recording, and reporting of the unintentional release in
transportation of hazardous materials; and
5. Design, manufacture, fabrication, inspection, marking, maintenance, recondition, repair,
or testing of a packaging or container represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified
for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce.
This final rule addresses covered subject items (3) and (4) above and is expected to
preempt state, local, and Indian tribe requirements not meeting the “substantively the same”

69
64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
74 FR 24693 (May 22, 2009).

standard. In this instance, the preemptive effect of the final rule is necessary to achieve the
objectives of the FAST Act and the hazardous materials transportation law under which the final
rule is promulgated. The final rule will not have substantial direct effects on states, the
relationship between the national government and states, or the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, PHMSA has concluded that
the consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.

D.

Executive Order 13175
PHMSA analyzed this rulemaking in accordance with the principles and criteria

contained in Executive Order 13175 (“Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments”)71 and DOT Order 5301.1A (“Department of Transportation Tribal Consultation
Policy and Procedures”). Executive Order 13175 and DOT Order 5301.1A require DOT agencies
to assure meaningful and timely input from Indian tribal government representatives in the
development of rules that significantly or uniquely affect tribal communities by imposing
“substantial direct compliance costs” or “substantial direct effects” on such communities or the
relationship and distribution of power between the Federal Government and Native American
tribes.
PHMSA assessed the impact of this action and has determined that it will not
significantly or uniquely affect tribal communities or Native American tribal governments. The
changes to the rail transportation requirements in the HMR as part of this action have national
scope, and also are limited to establishing baseline requirements for the compilation, updating,
and electronic exchange of hazardous materials information between railroads and authorized
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel. Therefore, PHMSA finds this action will neither significantly nor uniquely affect
tribal communities, nor impose substantial compliance costs on Native American tribal

65 FR 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000).

governments or mandate tribal action. Because this rulemaking will not adversely affect the safe
transportation of hazardous materials, it will not cause disproportionately high adverse risks for
tribal communities. For these reasons, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive
Order 13175 and DOT Order 5301.1A do not apply.

E.

Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires agencies to review

regulations to assess their impact on small entities, unless the agency head certifies that a
rulemaking will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
including small businesses; not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and
operated and are not dominant in their fields; and governmental jurisdictions with populations
under 50,000. The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs agencies to establish exceptions and
differing compliance standards for small businesses, where possible to do so and still meet the
objectives of applicable regulatory statutes. Executive Order 13272 (“Proper Consideration of
Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking”) requires agencies to establish procedures and policies to
promote compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and to “thoroughly review draft rules to
assess and take appropriate account of the potential impact” of the rules on small businesses,
governmental jurisdictions, and small organizations. The DOT posts its implementing guidance
on a dedicated webpage.72
This final rule has been developed in accordance with Executive Order 13272 and with
DOT’s procedures and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act to
ensure that potential impacts of draft rules on small entities are properly considered. This action
promotes the exchange of information about hazardous material on a train between railroads and
emergency response personal and law enforcement for the benefit of response to, or investigation

DOT, “Rulemaking Requirements Related to Small Entities,”
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/rulemaking-requirements-concerning-small-entities (last accessed June
17, 2021)
of, accidents or emergencies involving a train carrying hazardous material. The action applies to
railroads, some of which are small entities, such as regional and short line railroads. As discussed
at length in the final RIA—posted in the rulemaking docket—the actions adopted in this final
rule do not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
PHMSA determined that all 638 Class III railroads (100 percent) and 13 Class II railroads
(93 percent) can be considered small entities. None of the Class I railroads can be considered
small entities.

Railroad
Class I
Class II
Class III
Total

Affected entities
6
14
638
>1500 employees
Count
Percent
6
100%
1
7%
0
0%
1,500 or fewer employees
Count
Percent
0
0%
13
93%
638
100%
According to ASLRRA’s report, in 2017, the average annual revenues of a Class II and
Class III railroads were approximately $79 million and $4.75 million, respectively. PHMSA
converted these into 2022 dollars by using a deflation index of 1.17, resulting in an average
annual revenue of $92.43 million and $5.5 million for Class II and Class III, respectively. Based
on estimates, for Class II and III railroads, the per railroad undiscounted average annual cost of
the final rule is $17,017 and $521, respectively.
Amending the
definition of train
consist information

Amending notice to
train crew

Average
Annual
Cost
$155,659

Average
Annual
Cost Per
Railroad
$244

$156,581

$11,184

Class III

Number
of
Railroads
Average
Annual
Cost
$32,714

Average
Annual
Cost Per
Railroad
$51

Class II

$12,895

$921

Railroad
Class

New emergency
response information
sharing requirement

Average
Annual
Cost
$134,322

Average
Annual
Cost Per
Railroad
$226

Final
Rule
Average
Annual
Cost
$521

$68,762

$4,912

$17,017

PHMSA estimates the average annual cost of the rule is less than 0.1 percent of the
average annual revenue of Class II and Class III railroads. In consideration of the unique needs
of Class III railroads, in this final rule, PHMSA adopts an alternative compliance method for

Class III railroads that does not require the deployment of an electronic train consist system. The
alternative compliance method will provide an increase in the level of safety from the status quo,
without unduly burdening these small businesses. Additionally, PHMSA is adopting a two-year
delayed compliance period for Class II and III railroads to allow them sufficient time to make
any operational, cultural, or technological changes to comply with the requirements of this final
rule.
Based on this analysis, PHMSA certifies that this action will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

F.

Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA; 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), no person is

required to respond to an information collection unless it has been approved by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and displays a valid OMB control number. Section 1320.8(d)
of 5 CFR requires PHMSA to provide interested members of the public and affected agencies an
opportunity to comment on information and recordkeeping requests. This action will result in an
increase in annual burden and costs for information collection due to additional railroad
information requirements for hazardous materials transported by rail.
PHMSA has analyzed this final rule in accordance with the PRA, which requires federal
agencies to minimize paperwork burden imposed on the American public by ensuring maximum
utility and quality of federal information, ensuring the use of information technology to improve
government performance and improving the Federal Government’s accountability for managing
information collection activities. Under the PRA, no person is required to respond to any
information collection unless it has been approved by OMB and displays a valid OMB control
number.
In this final rule, PHMSA is adding six new information collections to OMB Control No.
2137-0559, “Rail Carrier and Tank Car Tanks Requirements, Rail Tank Car Tanks –

Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Rail.” PHMSA estimates that this final rule will result
in an overall increase in burden attributed to the requirement for additional emergency response
information on hazardous materials by rail. The amendments adopted in this final rule will
require railroads to make certain train consist information available electronically. Much of this
required information is already required of, and generally applied to, shippers who must then
provide the information to carriers (e.g., railroads). Shippers are also generally required to supply
emergency response information with the hazardous material shipping paper information. For
purposes of facilitating emergency response measures, the additional information collection
applied to railroads by this rule is expanded hazardous material train consist information that
includes the origin and destination of hazardous materials on a train and the specific
identification of hazardous material location in rail cars. Additionally, PHMSA is requiring
railroads to provide notice to state-authorized local responders when an accident or incident
involving hazardous material occurs.
Hazardous Materials Train Consist Information
As a result of the changes adopted in this final rule, PHMSA estimates that 658 railroads
(Class I, II, and III) will produce hazardous material train consist information approximately
131,042 times annually. PHMSA estimates the additional burden for this information collection
will take five minutes per response, resulting in approximately 10,876 additional burden hours
for the railroads (Class I, II, and III) (131,042 responses x five minutes). Additionally, PHMSA
estimates railroads will need to make an initial investment in building a system for electronic
sharing of train consist information. PHMSA conservatively assumes the initial cost of building
out a system will result in $500,000 in burden cost associated with this information collection.

Notification of Hazardous Materials Accidents or Incidents
Additionally, PHMSA estimates that 658 railroads (Class I, II, and III) will need to notify
local authorities of hazardous materials incidents 491 times annually. PHMSA understands that
not all Class II and III railroads transport hazardous materials, yet is estimating these costs using
a conservative assumption that all railroads may at some point transport hazardous material.
PHMSA estimates the additional burden added in this final rule will take 15 minutes resulting in
122.75 burden hours (491 hazardous materials incidents x 15 minutes per notification). There are
no additional burden costs associated with this information collection.
Creation of Records of Emergency Notification System Tests
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting a requirement for railroads to test their ability to
provide train consist information to primary PSAPs and emergency responders. In the first year,
PHMSA estimates it will take Class I and II railroads 40 hours each to create a test plan, and it
will take Class III railroads one hour to create a test plan. PHMSA estimates it will take Class I,
II, and III railroads one hour each succeeding year to review and update the plan as necessary to
account for changes in operations or geographic scope. The estimated information collection
burden hours in the first year is 1,438 burden hours ((20 Class I and II railroads x 40 hours) +
(638 Class III railroads x one hour)). This information collection will decrease in subsequent
years to 658 burden hours overall.
Retention of Records of Emergency Notification System Tests
PHMSA estimates that 20 Class I and II railroads will each conduct six tests of their
emergency notification system (see § 174.28(b)) annually, and the 638 Class III railroads will
conduct one test each. PHMSA estimates that it will take five minutes to retain and file the test
record for each test event. The estimated information collection burden hours for this
requirement is 62.9 hours ((20 Class I, Class II, railroads x six tests x five minutes) + (638 Class
III railroads x one test x five minutes)).
Creation of Records of Class III Railroad Alternative Compliance Method

In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting an alternative compliance method for Class III
railroads to account for the challenges in creating and providing electronic train consist
information. As part of this requirement, Class III railroads must create a plan that describes how
the railroad will provide accurate train consist information to primary PSAPs and local
emergency response organizations. PHMSA estimates that this requirement will apply to 388
Class III railroads. PHMSA estimates it will take a Class III railroad four hours to develop this
plan the first year, and one hour annually to review and update the plan to account for
operational or network changes. The estimated burden hours in the first year is 1,552 hours (388
x 4 hours). The estimated burden will decrease in subsequent years to 388 hours.
Retention of Records of Class III Railroad Alternative Compliance Method
PHMSA estimates it will take a Class III railroad five minutes to retain a record of the
plan, as required § 174.28(c). The estimated information collection burden is 32.2 hours (388
Class III railroads x five minutes).
A summary of the total increases for information collections under this OMB control
number are as follows:
Annual Increase in Number of Respondents: 3,408
Annual Increase in Number of Responses: 133,725
Annual Increase in Burden Hours: 14,084
Annual Increase in Burden Costs: $500,000
PHMSA has submitted the revised information collection and recordkeeping
requirements to OMB for approval.
Requests for a copy of this information collection should be directed to Steven Andrews
or Nina Vore, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, D.C. 20590-0001, 202-366-8553.

G.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA; 2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.) requires

agencies to assess the effects of federal regulatory actions on state, local, and tribal governments,
and the private sector. For any proposed or final rule that includes a federal mandate that may
result in the expenditure by state, local, and tribal governments, or by the private sector of $100
million or more in 1996 dollars in any given year, the agency must prepare, amongst other
things, a written statement that qualitatively and quantitatively assesses the costs and benefits of
the federal mandate.
As explained in the final RIA, this rulemaking is not expected to impose unfunded
mandates under the UMRA. Nor is it expected to result in costs of $100 million or more in 1996
dollars to either state, local, or tribal governments, or to the private sector, in any one year. A
copy of the final RIA is available for review in the rulemaking docket.

H.

Environmental Assessment
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et

seq.),73 requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions in the
decision-making process. NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental effects of
proposed federal actions prior to making decisions and involve the public in the decision-making
process. Agencies must prepare an environmental assessment (EA) for an action for which a
categorical exclusion is not applicable and is either unlikely to have significant effects, or when
the significance of the action is unknown. In accordance with these requirements, an EA must
briefly discuss: the need for the action; the alternatives considered; the environmental impacts of
the action and alternatives; and a listing of the agencies and persons consulted (40 CFR
§ 1508.9(b)). If, after reviewing public comments in response to the draft EA (DEA), an agency

Also at 40 CFR parts 1501 to 1508.

determines that a rule will not have a significant impact on the human or natural environment, it
can conclude the NEPA analysis with a finding of no significant impact (FONSI).
1. Purpose and Need for the Action
The FAST Act at Section 7302 instructs the Secretary to issue regulations that require a
Class I railroad transporting hazardous material to create accurate, real-time, and electronic train
consist information that must be provided “to State and local first responders, emergency
response officials, and law enforcement personnel that are involved in the response to or
investigation of an accident, incident, or public health or safety emergency involving the rail
transportation of hazardous materials.” Further, the NTSB has issued safety recommendation R07-04 recommending PHMSA and FRA collaborate to require all railroads to immediately
provide to emergency response personnel accurate, real-time information regarding the identity
and location of all hazardous materials on a train. In light of the stated need, the purpose of the
rule is to address the safety and environmental impacts of hazardous materials rail transportation
incidents by requiring railroads to provide real-time electronic train consist information to
federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel.
2. Alternatives Considered
No Action Alternative:
The no action alternative would not make any changes to the current regulatory
requirements that railroads must provide train crews with hard copy train consist information
about hazardous material and its location on the train. There would be no additional requirements
for railroads to generate, maintain, and provide in electronic form information regarding
hazardous material to first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel, or to forward this information to emergency response personnel in accident or
incident situations.
Adopted Action: All Railroads Alternative:

Under this alternative, railroads that transport hazardous materials are required to create
accurate train consist information about the hazardous material and its location on a train in both
a local printed paper copy maintained by train crews and an electronic copy maintained by the
railroad off-of-the-train, and providing it in real-time through electronic communications to
emergency response personnel. Railroads are also required to provide immediate telephonic
emergency notification and electronic train consist information to the primary PSAP (e.g., 9-1-1
call center) that covers the location where the accident or incident occurred immediately
following the accident or incident. Class III railroads (small, short-line railroads) are authorized
to meet an alternate compliance method that allows them to continue using paper-based train
consists, provided that they create an emergency communication plan; inform local emergency
response agencies about the contents of the plan; test the plan at least annually; and enact the
plan in emergencies involving hazardous materials. This alternative aims to enhance
transportation safety by transitioning away from exclusive reliance on train crews and hard copy
documents to exchange of information about hazardous material and their location on a train.
Class I Railroads Alternative:
Under this alternative, only Class I railroads, as defined by the Surface Transportation
Board, that transport hazardous materials would be subject to generating accurate train consist
information about the hazardous material and its location on a train (in both electronic and hard
copy forms), and providing it in real-time through electronic communication, to emergency
response personnel. Also, only Class I railroads would be required to provide an immediate
telephonic emergency notification and electronic train consist information to the primary PSAP
that covers the location where the accident or incident occurred immediately following the
accident or incident. This alternative aims to enhance transportation safety by transitioning away
from exclusive reliance on train crews and hard copy documents for the exchange of information
about hazardous materials and their locations on a train by adhering more closely to the FAST
Act mandate to implement measures for Class I railroads.

3. Affected Environment
The action in the final rule applies to all railroads that transport hazardous materials in
commerce. As such, PHMSA estimates the final rule will impact six Class I railroads, 14 Class II
railroads, and 638 Class III railroads and the surrounding environments. Of the 140,000 total
route-miles of track in the U.S., 104,000 miles are in rural and tribal areas.
Because the final rule would apply to all railroads that carry hazardous materials, it is
important to consider the existing environment related to freight transportation of hazardous
materials. Between 2010 and 2021, hazardous materials released in railroad accidents resulted in
a total of 326 injuries and no fatalities. Over this period there were 202 rail accidents that caused
a release of hazardous material, and 5,178 instances of a release of hazardous material not
associated with a rail accident (e.g., a failed valve allowing product to leak from a tank car).
While accidents involving hazardous materials by rail are rare, they can have serious
consequences. Recent examples of incidents involving trains carrying hazardous materials
include the Norfolk Southern trail derailment incident in East Palestine, Ohio, in 2023; the
derailment of a Conrail train in Paulsboro, New Jersey in 2012; and the Canadian National
Railway Company (CN) train collision in Anding, Mississippi, in 2005. In all three cases,
emergency personnel who responded to the incident did not gain access to information about the
train consist until well after they arrived on scene, which hampered emergency response efforts
and increased risks to the emergency responders and the local community.
4. Environmental Impacts of Final Action and Alternatives
No Action Alternative:
The PHMSA HMR and the FRA rail safety regulations work in tandem to keep
hazardous material in packages and rail cars on the tracks during transportation. In the unlikely
event of an incident or accident, train crews carry and maintain documentation, in addition to
hazard communication displayed on packages and rail cars, that federal, state, and local first

responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel can use to assess the
potential for, or threat from, a hazardous materials release and thus, appropriately respond.
The intent of the FAST Act mandate and NTSB safety recommendation to provide realtime electronic means of train consist information exchange is to provide greater assurances that
authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel have the right information about the hazardous material on a train without
delay. The presumption being that supplementing the existing hard copy train consist
information requirements by providing the information electronically, for instance, provides
better assurance that such information is accurate and in real-time, especially in the aftermath of
a derailment, and that real-time information will aid in response decision-making, leading to
safer outcomes for the public and the environment. The no action alternative would not require
any updates to the existing requirements or regulation of hazardous materials transportation and
incident response time and therefore, the additional safety, environmental, and public health
benefits of the adopted action would not be realized with the no action alternative.
Adopted Action: All Railroads Alternative (Final Rule):
This action would supplement existing requirements for hard copies of train consist
information maintained by train crews by requiring railroads to also create and provide accurate
and real-time train consist information to emergency response personnel. Railroads would be
required to use electronic communication to supplement their hard copy documentation and
communications requirements. Efficiencies will be introduced by requiring accurate and realtime information exchange with the goal of improved safety and enhanced response to
investigations of an accident or emergency involving hazardous material transported by rail.
The intent of the action is to foster and promote the general welfare of the human and
natural environment by providing enhanced emergency response and investigative efforts for
safer transport of hazardous materials. The action builds on the current HMR requirements for
hazardous material information sharing with the goal of improved rail transportation safety by

enhancing authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and
law enforcement personnel’s ability to assess, without delay, the potential for or extent of a
hazardous material release and take appropriate response measures. These enhanced safety
measures and requirements are geared toward addressing environmental effects including
avoidance of human exposure and water contamination. Compared to the no action alternative,
implementing the safety measures described in the final rule may also reduce the adverse
economic effects in local communities where incidents occur. Current research shows train
derailments can reduce property values, which can slow down economic activity in the area.74
The final rule aims to ensure emergency response personnel have timely, accurate, and
actionable information regarding the hazardous material they may encounter at the scene of a rail
accident or incident, thereby reducing the risks to surrounding communities and the environment
while expediting site remediation, restoration of rail service, and community engagement efforts
as investigation activity proceeds.
Regulations that require the increased use of electronic systems for transmission of train
consist information not only promote enhanced emergency response and investigative efforts for
accidents or incidents, but also respond to the FAST Act mandate and NTSB safety
recommendation R-07-04.
The final rule does not include any activities, such as ground disturbing activities,
building or landscape alterations, construction or installation of any new aboveground
components, or the introduction of visual, auditory, or atmospheric elements, that have the
potential to adversely affect, either temporarily or permanently, historic resources and/or cultural
resources, ecological resources, wetlands and waterways, or farmland.

For example, a study that examines the impact of 33 derailments involving hazardous material on property values
in New York State between 2004 and 2013 found that, on average, a derailment depreciates housing values within a
one-mile radius by five to eight percent (Chuan Tang et al. (2020). Rail accidents and property values in the era of
unconventional energy production. Journal of Urban Economics, 120, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2020.103295
Class I Railroads Only Alternative:
This alternative would require only Class I railroads to supplement existing hard copy
train consist information documentation requirements by creating and providing accurate, realtime electronic train consist information to emergency response personnel, and also providing an
immediate telephonic emergency notification and electronic train consist information to the
primary PSAP that covers the location where the accident or incident occurred immediately
following the accident or incident. Although the entirety of the nation’s rail network would not
be covered, applying this alternative would still affect about 68 percent of the nation’s rail
network and most of the hazardous materials freight traffic. Class I railroads operate on about
90,000 miles of the 140,000-mile U.S. freight rail network.
This modified version of the action would still provide safety and environmental benefits
by enhancing authorized federal, state, and local first responders, emergency response officials,
and law enforcement personnel’s ability to assess without delay the potential for a hazardous
material release and take appropriate response measures. Similar to the action applicable to all
railroads, this approach also builds on the HMR provisions for hazardous material information
sharing, just to a narrower extent, applicable to only Class I railroads. The enhanced safety
measures and requirements are geared toward addressing environmental effects, including
avoidance of human exposure and water contamination. Similar to the final rule, this alternative
would not include any activities, such as ground disturbing activities, building or landscape
alterations, construction or installation of any new aboveground components, or the introduction
of visual, auditory, or atmospheric elements, that have the potential to adversely affect, either
temporarily or permanently, historic resources and/or cultural resources, ecological resources,
wetlands and waterways, or farmland.
5. Environmental Justice

Executive Order 12898 (“Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations”),75 directs federal agencies to take appropriate and
necessary steps to identify and address disproportionately high and adverse effects of federal
actions on the health or environment of minority and low-income populations to the greatest
extent practicable and permitted by law. DOT Order 5610.2C (“U.S. Department of
Transportation Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations”) establishes departmental procedures for effectuating Executive Order
12898 promoting the principles of environmental justice through full consideration of
environmental justice principles throughout planning and decision-making processes in the
development of programs, policies, and activities—including PHMSA rulemaking.
Executive Order 14096—“Revitalizing Our Nation’s Commitment to Environmental
Justice for All”—was enacted on April 21, 2023. Executive Order 14096 on environmental
justice does not rescind Executive Order 12898—“Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,” which has been in effect since
February 11, 1994, and is currently implemented through DOT Order 5610.2C. This
implementation will continue until further guidance is provided regarding the implementation of
the new Executive Order 14096 on environmental justice.
Through the NEPA process, PHMSA has evaluated this final rule under DOT Order
5610.2C and Executive Order 12898, and has determined it will not cause disproportionately
high and adverse human health and environmental effects on minority and low-income
populations. The final rule will not result in any adverse environmental or health impact on
minority populations and low-income populations. Rather, PHMSA anticipates the final action to
have a positive impact on the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail by requiring all
trains carrying hazardous materials to have real-time information available to authorized federal,
state, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement personnel in

59 FR 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).

the event of an accident or incident—particularly rail lines in urban or rural areas posing higher
risks due to their proximity to minority and low-income communities in the vicinity of those rail
lines. To the extent that the nation’s rail network passes through geographic locations of minority
populations, low-income populations, or other underserved and other disadvantaged
communities, and in the unfortunate circumstance of a rail accident or emergency involving
hazardous materials, the final action will have a positive impact by aiding emergency response
personnel and law enforcement in more quickly assessing potential threats from the hazardous
materials and taking appropriate measures to protect public health and the environment. Lastly,
as explained in this EA above, the final action will likely reduce environmental risks posed by
hazardous material rail incidents.
6. List of Preparers and Reviewers
Carolyn Nelson, P.E., PHMSA
Lydia Wang, PHMSA
7. Agencies and Persons Consulted
PHMSA published this final rule in consultation with FRA. In addition, PHMSA and
FRA worked with stakeholders through several RSAC Hazardous Material Issues Working
Group meetings. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NTSB, and a variety of rail
industry stakeholders, such as the AAR and the IAFC, participated in these meetings. Ultimately,
some participants in the Working Group concluded that electronic train consist information could
be a valuable option for improving emergency response efforts, and the AskRail® system could
be extended beyond Class I railroads.
On June 27, 2023, PHMSA published an NPRM76 on this topic, and solicited comments
from the regulated community and other interested parties on the implementation of real-time
train consist information. PHMSA extended the comment period for an additional 60 days.77

76 Ibid
4.
88 FR 55430 (Aug. 15, 2023). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-08-15/pdf/2023-17472.pdf

PHMSA received 32 sets of comments to the NPRM, which are discussed in detail in Section IV
above. In this final rule, PHMSA adopts modified requirements related to the delayed
compliance period, information on the origin and destination of the train, the emergency
notification required after an accident or incident, and the railroad’s designated emergency point
of contact based on comments submitted to the NPRM. Please see Section III.G and IV above for
more details on the public input PHMSA received.
8. Finding of No Significant Impact
As discussed in the EA above and given that the purpose of the rule is to address safety
and environmental impacts of potential future hazardous materials rail transportation incidents,
PHMSA finds that the adopted action (All Railroads Alternative) will have no significant impact
on the environment. This is based on the analysis presented in the ANPRM, NPRM, the final
rule, supporting documents, and this EA.

I.

Privacy Act
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the public to better

inform any amendments to the HMR considered in this rulemaking. DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal information the commenter provides, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS).
DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement is available in the Federal Register,78 or on DOT’s
website at http://www.dot.gov/privacy.

J.

Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
Executive Order 13609 (“Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation”)79 requires

that agencies consider whether the impacts associated with significant variations between

78
65 FR 19477 (Apr. 11, 2000).
77 FR 26413 (May 4, 2012).

domestic and international regulatory approaches are unnecessary or may impair the ability of
American business to export and compete internationally. In meeting shared challenges
involving health, safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues, international regulatory
cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be
adopted in the absence of such cooperation. International regulatory cooperation can also reduce,
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.
Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465) (as amended, the Trade Agreements Act),
prohibits agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Pursuant to the Trade
Agreements Act, the establishment of standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the
foreign commerce of the United States, so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic
objective, such as providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude imports that meet this
objective. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
PHMSA participates in the establishment of international standards to protect the safety
of the American public, and it has assessed the effects of the action to ensure that it does not
cause unnecessary obstacles to foreign trade. Accordingly, this rulemaking is consistent with
Executive Order 13609 and PHMSA’s obligations under the Trade Agreements Act.

K.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) of 1995 (15 U.S.C.

272 note) directs federal agencies to use voluntary consensus standards in their regulatory
activities unless doing so would be inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical.
Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards—e.g., specification of materials, test
methods, or performance requirements—that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus

standard bodies. This rulemaking does not adopt voluntary consensus standards, and therefore
the NTTAA does not apply.

L.

Cybersecurity and Executive Order 14082
Executive Order 14082 (“Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity”)80 expressed the

Administration policy that “the prevention, detection, assessment, and remediation of cyber
incidents is a top priority and essential to national and economic security.” Executive Order
14082 directed the Federal Government to improve its efforts to identify, deter, and respond to
“persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns.” Consistent with
Executive Order 14082, In October 2022 the TSA issued a Security Directive to reduce the risk
that cybersecurity threats pose to critical railroad operations and facilities through
implementation of layered cybersecurity measures that provide defense in depth.81
PHMSA has considered the effects of the final rule and has determined that its regulatory
amendments would not materially affect the cybersecurity risk profile for rail transportation of
hazardous materials. PHMSA acknowledges that the requirements within this final rule
pertaining to the sharing of electronic train consist information (some of which may be
proprietary or security-sensitive information) could have some effect on the cybersecurity risk
profile of rail transportation of hazardous material. However, PHMSA notes it has adopted in
this final rule (consistent with a mandate in Section 7302(a)(5) of the FAST Act) explicit
language at § 174.28(d) that would require such information sharing be performed in a manner
that is protective of security and confidentiality interests. PHMSA also notes that, as explained in
the discussion of § 174.28 within Sections III.F-G. above, railroads that are affected by this final
rule’s requirements may be participants in existing industry cybersecurity risk-mitigation
initiatives, or subject to recent TSA guidance for mitigation of cybersecurity risks associated

86 FR 26633 (May 17, 2021).
TSA, Security Directive No. 1580/82-2022-01, “Rail Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions and Testing” (Oct. 24,
2022).
80
with rail transportation of hazardous material. PHMSA understands these considerations address
any potential alteration in cybersecurity risks profiles due to this final rule’s information-sharing
requirements.

M.

Severability
The purpose of this final rule is to operate holistically in addressing different issues

related to safety and environmental hazards associated with the rail transportation of hazardous
materials. However, PHMSA recognizes that certain provisions focus on unique topics.
Therefore, PHMSA preliminarily finds that the various provisions of this final rule are severable
and able to function independently if severed from each other; thus, in the event a court were to
invalidate one or more of this final rule’s unique provisions, the remaining provisions should
stand and continue in effect.

List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 171
Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, Imports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 174
Emergency Preparedness, Hazardous materials transportation, Railroad safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 180
Hazardous materials transportation, Motor carriers, Motor vehicle safety, Packaging and
containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

In consideration of the foregoing, PHMSA amends 49 CFR Chapter I as follows:
PART 171—GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

1. The authority citation for part 171 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; Pub. L. 101-410 section 4; Pub. L. 104-134,
section 31001; Pub. L. 114-74 section 4 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
2. In § 171.8, remove the definition for “train consist” and add in its place a definition for
“train consist information” to read as follows:
§ 171.8 Definitions.
*

*

*

*

*

Train consist information means a hard (printed) copy or electronic record of the position
and contents of each hazardous material rail car where the record includes the information
required by § 174.26 of this subchapter.
*

*

*

*

*

PART 174—CARRIAGE BY RAIL
3. The authority citation for part 174 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128; 33 U.S.C. 1321; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
4. Revise § 174.26 to read as follows:
§ 174.26 Notice to train crews.
(a) Prior to movement of a train, a railroad must provide the train crew with train consist
information as defined in § 171.8 of this subchapter in hard-copy (printed paper) form that
includes: a railroad-designated emergency response point of contact (including contact phone
number) in a conspicuous location; and the position in the train and contents of each hazardous
material rail car by reporting mark and number, to include the:
(1) Point of origin and destination of the train;
(2) Shipping paper information required by §§ 172.201 to 172.203 of this subchapter; and
(3) Emergency response information required by § 172.602(a) of this subchapter.
(b) The train crew must update the train consist information to reflect any changes in the
train consist information occurring at intermediate stops prior to continued movement of the

train. Additionally, any update to the train consist information must be made and reflected in the
electronic train consist information required pursuant to § 174.28 of this subpart prior to
continued movement of the train. The train crew may use electronic, radio communications, or
other means to notify the railroad to update the electronic train consist information. Class III
railroads complying with the alternative compliance requirements described in § 174.28(c) of
this subpart are not subject to the requirement to update electronic train consist information.
(c) The train consist information must always be immediately available for use by the
train crew while the train is in transportation. When the train crew is aboard the train locomotive,
the train consist information shall be stowed in a conspicuous location of the occupied
locomotive.
(d) Railroad operating rules for use of electronic devices by the train crew and use of
electronic devices by the train crew in association with updates to train consist information
requirements of this section and § 174.28 of this subchapter must comply with 49 CFR Part 220,
Subpart C.
5. Add § 174.28 to subpart B to read as follows:
§ 174.28 Electronic Train Consist Information.
(a) Retention and notification requirements. Each railroad operating a train carrying
hazardous materials must at all times maintain in electronic form, off the train, accurate train
consist information as required in § 174.26 of this subpart. Each railroad must make such
electronic train consist information immediately accessible at all times to its designated
emergency response point of contact such that they are able to communicate train consist
information to Federal, State, and local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel seeking assistance. Each railroad must also provide, using electronic
communication (e.g., a software application or electronic data interchange, etc.), that electronic
train consist information to authorized Federal, State, and local first responders, emergency
response officials, and law enforcement personnel along the train route that could be or are

involved in the response to, or investigation of, an accident, incident, or public health or safety
emergency involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials such that the information is
immediately available for use at the time it is needed.
(b) Emergency notification. (1) General requirements. When a train carrying hazardous
materials is involved in either an accident requiring response from local emergency response
agencies, or in an incident involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material
from a rail car in the train requiring response from local emergency response agencies, the
railroad must immediately notify the primary Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)—e.g., 9-11 call center—telephonically that is responsible for the area where the accident or incident
occurred and must separately notify the track owner (should the railroad transporting the
hazardous materials not be the track owner) and forward train consist information in electronic
form to the PSAP and track owner in a form they are capable of readily accessing (e.g., email,
fax, software application, etc.).
(2) Notification system test. At least annually, each railroad that operates trains carrying
hazardous materials must test the notification system used to comply with the requirements of
this paragraph. Railroads must:
(i) Develop a testing protocol addressing frequency and locations to ensure reliability
across all areas where the railroad operates trains carrying hazardous materials.
(ii) Create a record of each system test that identifies at least the following information:
(A) The date of the test;
(B) The method used to provide the notification;
(C) The name and location of the primary PSAP (e.g., 9-1-1 call center) and/or track
owner to whom the notification was sent;
(D) Whether or not the test notification was received and acknowledged; and

(E) For system tests that are not immediately received and acknowledged, an analysis of
the contributing factors to the failure and corrective actions taken by the railroad to prevent such
a failure from recurring.
(iii) Retain test records for at least five years.
(c) Class III railroad alternative compliance requirements. In place of the requirements
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, a Class III railroad, as determined by the Surface
Transportation Board under § 1201.1–1 of this title, transporting hazardous materials may
comply with the alternative procedures in this paragraph to provide accurate train consist
information to Federal, State, or local first responders, emergency response officials, and law
enforcement personnel in the event of an incident, accident, or public health or safety emergency
involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials. The Class III railroad must:
(1) Develop a written plan that identifies the procedures for emergency notification and
how the railroad will provide accurate train consist information in the event of an accident
involving a train carrying hazardous materials requiring response from local emergency response
agencies, or an incident involving the release or suspected release of a hazardous material from a
rail car in the train requiring response from local emergency response agencies. This may be
accomplished via the primary PSAP (e.g., 9-1-1 call center) responsible for the area where the
accident or incident occurred. The written plan must assign at least one person not on board the
locomotive with the responsibility to provide accurate train consist information in addition to the
train crew onboard the locomotive, unless there are no employees of the Class III railroad
capable of fulfilling this function.
(2) Notify emergency response organizations and primary PSAPs along their route about
the contents of the written plan and any material changes to the plan made after the initial
notification.
(3) Enact the written plan when an accident involving a train carrying hazardous
materials requiring response from local emergency response agencies, or an incident involving

the release or suspected release of a hazardous material from a rail car in the train requiring
response from local emergency response agencies occurs. The Class III railroad must provide
immediate emergency notification telephonically to the primary PSAP (e.g., 9-1-1 call center)
responsible for the area where the accident or incident occurred, and provide accurate train
consist information to appropriate entities based on their written plan.
(4) Retain a copy of this written plan at the Class III railroad’s primary place of business
and provide a copy to authorized representatives of the Department upon request.
(5) Conduct a test, at least annually, of the procedures for emergency notification and
transmission of accurate train consist information. Each Class III railroad must create a record of
the test that includes at least the following information:
(i) The date of the test;
(ii) A brief description of the method of emergency notification and transmission of train
consist information;
(iii) The name and location of the recipient of the emergency notification and train
consist information;
(iv) Whether or not the test was successful in providing emergency notification and train
consist information to the intended recipient;
(v) For unsuccessful tests, an analysis of the contributing factors to the failure and
corrective actions taken by the railroad to prevent such a failure from recurring.
(6) Retain test records required in paragraph (c)(5) of this section for at least five years.
(d) Security measures. Each railroad must implement security and confidentiality
protections in generating, updating, providing, and forwarding train consist information in
electronic or other form pursuant to this section to ensure they provide access only to authorized
persons. Nothing in this paragraph shall limit a railroad from entering into agreements with other
railroads or persons to develop and implement a secure process for generating, updating,
providing, and forwarding that information.

(e) Provision of train consist information. No railroad may withhold, or cause to be
withheld, the train consist information described in paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of this section from
Federal, State, or local first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement
personnel in the event of an incident, accident, or public health or safety emergency involving
the rail transportation of hazardous materials. If a railroad uses a software application to meet the
requirements of this section, it must provide all first responders, emergency response officials,
and law enforcement personnel responding to, or investigating, an accident, incident, or public
health or safety emergency involving the rail transportation of hazardous materials access, in
accordance with the security and confidentiality protections required in paragraph (d), to the train
consist information contained within that application without delay for the duration of the
response or investigation.
PART 180—CONTINUING QUALIFICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
PACKAGINGS
6. The authority citation for part 180 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
7. In § 180.503, the definition “train consist” is removed.
Issued in Washington, DC on June 14, 2024, under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.

Tristan H. Brown
Deputy Administrator
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[FR Doc. 2024-13474 Filed: 6/21/2024 8:45 am; Publication Date: 6/24/2024]